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This dissertation uses mathematical economic models and advanced statistical and 
econometric tools to study knowledge markets, external validity, and institutional 
changes. In Chapter 1, I focus on knowledge markets exploring how network 
relationships between knowledge consumers impact the equilibrium number of 
opinion leaders. Both a theoretical model and empirical analysis show that there’ll be 
more opinion leaders in a knowledge market if the most active knowledge consumers 
occupy more central positions in a social network connecting consumers. This is the 
first work to formally quantify opinion leaders, knowledge markets, and consumer 
attention. While the existing literature emphasizes the role of opinion providers’ 
network positions on the making of opinion leaders, this work shows that the network 
positions of active consumers also matter because active consumers serve as a 
propaganda machine. In Chapter 2, Professor Sebastian Galiani and I provide a 
formal, general exploration of the question of external validity and propose a simple 
and generally applicable method for evaluating the external validity of randomized 
  
controlled trials.  This is important. Once researchers have conducted an internally 
valid analysis, that analysis yields an established set of findings for the specific case 
in question. As for the future usefulness of that result, what matters is its degree of 
external validity. In Chapter 3, I theoretically argue that people weigh specialization 
gains against trade costs when they decide whether to specialize and trade or self-
produce all goods by themselves, and thus more people participate in trade under 
better institutions. I show that the better the institution of an economy’s trade partner, 
the more prosperous the economy is, thanks to expanded trade. Moreover, when more 
people trade, more people would like to fight for a better institution and may induce 
institutional improvement. Better initial institutions or lower trade costs facilitate 
institutional improvements; but with very high initial institutional quality, people may 




























Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor Sebastian Galiani, Chair 
Professor Peter Murrell 
Professor John Wallis 
Professor Ingmar Prucha 









































Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... ii 
Chapter 1: Socially Embedded Knowledge Networks and the Making of Opinion 
Leaders: Evidence from Twitter ................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Assessing External Validity ...................................................................... 42 
Chapter 3: Development Spillover and Institutional Changes: A Trade Economy 
Political Perspective .................................................................................................... 63 





Chapter 1: Socially Embedded Knowledge Networks and the 





1. Introduction and related literature 
The importance of knowledge markets is acknowledged in economics (Coase and 
Wang, 2012), but research on knowledge markets is scarce compared with work on 
commodity, service, or factor markets. Probably, the most important economic insight 
on knowledge markets is still from Hayek’s 1945 paper “The Use of Knowledge in 
Society.” Hayek (1945) argues that the decentralized use of knowledge in a 
knowledge market is essential to the workings of a society and no centralized 
mechanism can substitute. In that paper, the underlying network structure of the 
knowledge market is assumed symmetric and regular: each agent is both a knowledge 
supplier and a knowledge consumer, and their interactions are homogenous, that is, 
well-stirred. This assumption helps Hayek and generations of his readers to focus on 
his specific insights, but in the social networks underlying real knowledge markets, it 
is often the case that there are “a handful of very influential celebrities on one side 
and many millions of people with just a couple of followers on the other” (Bruner, 
2013).  
 
A common theme in knowledge markets is self-organized concentration of to whom 
knowledge consumers pay attention, which arises from a decentralization process 
where social influence between consumers plays an important role (Salganik, Dodd, 
and Watts, 2006). To whom people pay attention is an extensively studied topic 
(Jackson, 2019; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). But to the best of our knowledge, there 
has been no formal treatment of the question of how the number of opinion leaders in 
a topic (in a knowledge market) is determined, apart from the influence of the total 





show that the structure of knowledge-consumer interactions has a significant impact 
on the number of opinion producers.  
 
This is an important step in understanding the development of knowledge markets for 
two reasons. First, more opinion leaders means more competition in a knowledge 
market, and more competition usually implies higher information quality and more 
responsiveness to consumer welfare. Second, more opinion leaders can also indicate 
more diversity among widely heard opinions, and such diversity keeps non-
mainstream opinions alive, enhancing a society’s adaptive efficiency (a concept 
emphasized by North (1990) and North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009)). 
 
In our paper we emphasize the role played by specific social embeddedness of 
economic agents, since another motivation of this paper is to understand the 
implications for knowledge market structure of the network effects via pre-existing 
relationships between consumers.  
 
Network effects, especially for information products and technologies, are well 
documented in the field of industrial organization (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015). For 
our purpose, we define network effects as existing when a consumer of a product is 
connected with other consumers in a network and the consumption activities of his 
connected consumers increase his consumption activity. This is a kind of social 
influence. Note our definition is slightly different from the usual definition of 
network effects, as given by Belleflamme and Peitz (2015): “a product is said to 
exhibit network effects if each user’s utility is increasing in the number of other users 
of that product or of products compatible with it.” We think it’s usually the case that 
not all other users’ consumption would have an impact on a user but rather his 
connected consumers would. Besides, the number of other users is only one part of 
other users’ consumption activities and the frequency or amount of others’ 
consumption should also matter. Consistent with Belleflamme and Peitz’s (2015) 
definition, the current literature on network effects mainly focuses on well-stirred 





to interact and influence each other depends only on the proportion of each type of 
consumer. To put it in another way, the existing literature mainly focuses on complete 
networks: everybody is interacting or adjacent to everybody. Such an assumption of 
symmetric social distribution of economic agents usually makes things tractable and 
thus facilitates many models yielding important and interesting economic insights. 
(See Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) for various examples.) In contrast, in this paper 
we obtain insights from networked social influence, i.e., consumers influence each 
other based on where they are embedded in a network connecting consumers, rather 
than in a homogenous way; this is why we have “socially embedded knowledge 
network” in the title. As will be seen, pre-existing relationships between consumers 
have an impact on the number of suppliers. Thus, in our paper we emphasize the role 
played by specific social embeddedness of economic agents, the importance of which 
is emphasized by Grannovetter (2017) and Thurner, Hanel, and Klimek, (2018).  
 
In emphasizing social embeddedness, we put network positions foremost in our story. 
There is a large amount of literature on various implications of agents’ network 
positions as surveyed by Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Jackson (2019), and Newman 
(2018). Major studies related to ours are on the relationship between the social 
network position of a knowledge supplier and the supplier’s influence (Grannovetter, 
1973) and on the concentration of attention to a few opinion leaders (Barabási and 
Albert, 1999). Variations under these two themes are surveyed by Easley and 
Kleinberg (2010), Page (2018), and Newman (2018). The importance of social 
networks or social embeddedness (Grannovetter, 1985 and 2017) is a common theme. 
However, formal studies that aggregate individual network positions to understand 
macro-level implications are few. Engle, Macy, and Claxton (2010) provide one 
example: so is our paper, given its third motivation to connect micro-level structure to 
macro-level performance (Schelling, 2006). 
 
Having talked about motivation and existing literature, let’s now intuitively 
summarize the theoretical insights and then talk about what we do and find in the 






Heterogeneous consumers are connected with each other in a social network. If the 
most active knowledge consumers, who have high ability to impact others through 
network effects due to their intensive consumption behavior, occupy more central 
positions in the network, there’ll be more concentration of consumer attention to 
some opinion producers. This is because when more enthusiastic consumers are 
located in the central positions in the network, they’ll have more influence on which 
opinion producers other consumers would pay attention to.1 Opinion producers are 
assumed uniformly distributed everywhere and can become opinion leaders with 
enough followers. Thus, there is a concentration process that leads to more opinion 
leaders, in contrast to uniformly distributed attention that is not sufficient anywhere to 
give rise to opinion leaders. Another theoretical implication of this concentration 
process is that opinion leaders’ similarity in terms of who follow them increases when 
enthusiastic consumers occupy more central positions in the social network. Such a 
concentration phenomenon also appears in Salganik, Dodd, and Watts (2006) where 
consumers, under social influence, tend to concentrate their song downloads on a few 
music providers.  
 
To make matters clearer, let’s consider an extreme case. If consumers have no impact 
on adjacent consumers, consumers follow unrelated sets of opinion producers. So, 
let’s assume each consumer follows a unique opinion producer. Then no opinion 
producer would be an opinion leader, each having only a very small number of 
followers. In contrast, when there is social influence and therefore people concentrate 
all their attention on a few opinion producers, some opinion producers become 
opinion leaders. 
 
Our formal theory inspires and is supported by our empirical analysis using a Twitter 
network and related tweets. We view a single knowledge market as consisting of the 
consumers and opinion producers within a community (a sub-network relatively 
 
1 The central position is central because it is contagious and thus generates influence to all other positions in all 





isolated from other parts of the Twitter network) who focus on a specific topic. To 
identify topics, we estimate a topic model and find 45 topics in tweets of intensely 
followed Twitter users. To identify separate communities, we use network 
community detection and find four nearly isolated Twitter communities. Each 
combination of topic and community constitutes a knowledge market for which we 
formally define variables including the number of opinion leaders (the main 
dependent variable) and the network centrality of the most active knowledge 
consumers (the main explanatory variable). Each knowledge market is a sample point 
for regression analysis. Controlling for topic fixed effects, community fixed effects, 
and the total amount of consumer attention to a topic in a community, we find that 
when enthusiastic followers occupy more central network positions, the number of 
opinion leaders increases and opinion leaders’ similarity in terms of who follow them 
increases. A variety of robustness tests supports this finding.  
 
We use data from Hodas and Lerman (2014) a user network in Twitter and the URLs 
that appear in each user’s tweets. We use a state-of-art topic model for text analysis 
over tweets, the correlated topic model (Blei and Lafferty, 2006; Roberts, Stewart, 
and Tingley, 2014). Gentzkow, Kelly, and Taddy (2017) provide a good survey of the 
economic analysis using text as data. In order to yield variables used for regression 
analysis, these topic modeling outcomes are combined with the network analysis 
explained in what follows. A sub-field of network science, community detection, 
focuses on dividing a network into communities within which nodes are densely 
connected and between which nodes are sparsely connected (Thurner, Hanel, and 
Klimek, 2018; Newman, 2018). We use a state-of-the-art network community 
detection algorithm for very large networks (Clauset, Newman, and Moore, 2004; 
Csardi, 2019), and divide the whole Twitter network into communities. Using the 
network communities that are detected and the topic modeling outcomes, we define 
variables in our regression analysis that are topic-community specific; an observation 






To address endogeneity concerns, we use a friendship network as an instrument for 
the whole network. Our main explanatory variables, the network position centrality of 
enthusiastic consumers, are constructed based on the whole Twitter network. For a 
topic, this centrality measure is a function of network structure, which might be 
affected by some topic-community specific characteristic that also affects the number 
of and the similarity between opinion leaders. To address this endogeneity concern, 
we construct the network position centrality of enthusiastic consumers based only on 
a friendship network.2 Under the assumption that the friendship network is subject to 
endogeneity concerns to a lesser degree than the original network, the outcome based 
on the friendship network would be significantly different from that based on the 
whole network only if endogeneity were really a serious concern. The contrapositive 
of this logic is this: under the assumption that the friendship network is subject to 
endogeneity concerns to a lesser degree than the original network,3 if the outcome 
based on friendship network is not significantly different from that based on the 
whole network, endogeneity is not a concern. Wald tests fail to reject the equivalence 
of estimates based on both networks. Endogeniety is not a problem. 
 
This paper makes the following contributions. Compared with most of the literature 
on network effects, the network effects explored in this paper are non-homogenously 
networked rather than well-stirred. This is a feature of both our theoretical and 
empirical work. Moreover, understanding knowledge markets, especially formally 
understanding the sources of opinion diversity, is a less explored field. The key 
variables both in our theory and in our empirical part are dealt with intuitively in the 
existing literature. But to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to formally 
define opinion leaders, knowledge consumers, and amount of attention. Last but not 
least, as summarized in section 5, the paper makes some methodological 
contributions by constructing a new type of IV based on a multi-layer network 
 
2 We get the friendship network by dropping all the directed links in the whole network that don’t have a 
reciprocal (this turns out to be a large change of the network, see section 3 for detail). 
3 The intuition behind this assumption: If I follow you and you don’t follow me, it’s probable that I treat you as an 
knowledge supplier; if I follow you and you also follow me it’s possible but less probable that I treat you as a 





perspective, using network community detection techniques to construct a panel data 
structure, emphasizing the embeddedness perspective (Grannovetter, 1985 and 2017). 
 
The presentation proceeds as follows: In section 2, we derive insights via a 
mathematical model. In section 3, we introduce the data, explain and present the text 
analysis outcomes, and define key variables used in the regression analysis. Section 4 
explains the major empirical findings. In section 5 we talk about methodology 




Having intuitively summarized the theoretical insights, we now provide the formal 
model. 
 
2.1 Environment setup and opinion producers 
This is a static model. We model a knowledge market for a topic with supply and 
demand sides and model how economic agents connect and influence each other. 
Before detailing behavioral assumptions for opinion producers and knowledge 
consumers, let’s first introduce the environmental setup, especially the social 
embeddedness assumption. (Grannovetter (2017) emphasizes the importance of being 
clear about the social embeddedness of economic agents in understanding many 
social phenomena.) 
 
There is a line of length 3 (see Figure 1 below on Page 9) and agents (knowledge 
consumers and opinion producers) are distributed along the line in a way that will be 
specified soon. We regard the line 0-3 as a social space. Distance in a social space 
measures how closely people are connected in a social network. At this moment it 
suffices to know that knowledge consumers near each other tend to influence each 
other and that knowledge consumers tend to follow (pay attention to) opinion 





department in US, my social network position makes me familiar with many US 
economists but it’s harder for me to be familiar with economists in Japan. 
 
An opinion producer rests at every point on the line. Thus, opinion producers are 
uniformly distributed along the line. Opinion producers are made into opinion leaders 
by the process of consumers choosing to follow them. Specifically, each opinion 
producer has a probability of being an opinion leader that increases in the number of 
consumers following them. Let q be the total number of knowledge consumers paying 
attention to (following) him. We assume a continuum of consumers of which the 
measure is one, so 𝑞 ∈ [0,1]. For concreteness, we assume the probability for an 
opinion producer to be an opinion leader is !
"#$!(#$%)
, where δ governs the slope of the 
increasing curve. We model the behavior pattern of opinion producers in this 
simplified form since the pivot of our story rests on the demand side at the interaction 
of social influence with social network structure; the simplification makes the model 
tractable and loses no economic insights. 
 
Actually, any convex curve instead of !
"#$!(#$%)
 will also do. We need convexity 
because it helps us to capture an important intuition in the previous section which we 
repeat below: 
 
If consumers have no impact on their adjacent consumers, consumers 
can follow independent sets of opinion producers. So let’s assume each 
consumer follows a unique opinion producer. Then no opinion producer 
would be an opinion leader due to this very small number of followers. 
However, when there is social influence and people concentrate all their 
attention to a few opinion producers, then some opinion producers will 
become opinion leaders. 
 
To have this concentration effect after combining the demand and supply sides, we 





attention areas decreases the number of opinion leaders by less than the number of 





Knowledge consumers rest only at points 1, 2, and 1.5 (no consumers are from other 
points). There is a continuum of consumers of which the measure is 1. A half of 
consumers are at 1.5 and the rest are evenly divided between 1 and 2. Besides, a half 
of consumers are enthusiastic and willing to pay H units of attention on the topic in 
this knowledge market (i.e., each of them spreads the H units of attention over a 
number of chosen opinion producers), and the other half are unenthusiastic and 
willing to pay L units of attention. H>L>0 and we assume (H+L)/2 =1 to streamline 
notation without loss of generality. We assume %
!
 H-consumers and "&%
!
 L-consumers 
0 2 1.5 1 3 
Consumers from 2 pay attention to opinion 
producers either between 1 and 2 or between 
2 and 3, but not both. 
Consumers from 1.5 pay attention to opinion 
producers between 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 
__ Consumers are only from points 1, 2, and 1.5. 
__ At each point between 0 and 3 rest a opinion producer. 
__ !
"
 H-consumers and #$!
"
 L-consumers rest at point 1.5; #$!
%
 H-consumers and !
%
 L-consumers 
rest at point 1 and point 2 respectively. So half are at center and half are at periphery. 
Consumers from 1 pay attention to opinion 
producers either between 1 and 2 or between 










 L-consumers are at point 1 and point 2 respectively, i.e., at the periphery. 
 
π ∈ (0, 1). When π increases, there’ll be more enthusiastic consumers at the center of 
the social space (or of a social network) with the total attention of all consumers kept 
constant. So π measures the degree to which enthusiastic knowledge consumers 
occupy the central network position (point 1.5). π corresponds to the key explanatory 
variables in our regression analysis. Occupying the central position generates 
influence in two directions, while occupying peripheral positions only generates 
influence in one direction. We make a distinction between being at the center and 
being at peripheries and use π as the key parameter in our model because the central 
idea of the paper is that enthusiastic consumers in a knowledge market have more 
influence on other consumers through network effects when they occupy more central 
positions in a network connecting consumers. This greater influence leads to more 
opinion leaders, as will be seen when we complete the model. 
 
We make the following assumptions to capture the importance of social space and 
positions therein and to model social influence as a function of how people are close 
to each other in a social space. Consumers from point 1.5 are only able to pay 
attention to opinion producers distributed between 1 and 2. The decision of paying 
how much attention to each opinion producers follows below. Consumers from point 
1 are able to pay attention to opinion producers distributed either between 1 and 2 or 
between 0 and 1, but not both. Specifically, each of the consumers from point 1 
chooses whether to pay his attention to the opinion producers on his left (from point 0 
to point 1) or to those on his right (from point 1 to point 2); in the meanwhile, he also 
chooses how much attention to pay to each opinion producer on the chosen side. 
Consumers from point 2 are able to pay attention to opinion producers distributed 
either between 1 and 2 or between 2 and 3, but not both. Specifically, each of the 
consumers from point 2 first chooses whether to pay his attention to the opinion 





point 3); in the meanwhile, he also chooses how much attention to pay to each 
opinion producer on the chosen side. Thus consumers from point 1.5 are more central 
in the sense that both halves of the area covered by their attention overlap with 
what’re covered by consumers from point 1 and 2. As will be seen soon, this overlap 
in two directions means consumers at point 1.5 can generate influence in two 
directions 
 
2.2 Behavioral and interaction assumptions for knowledge consumers 
Every knowledge consumer distributes the attention he’s willing to pay among 
opinion producers he is able to reach. Let 𝑎()	 be the amount of attention paid by 
consumer i to opinion producer k (who rests at position k). So for enthusiastic 
consumers, the attention budget constraints are 𝑎()	 ≥ 0 and ∫ 𝑎()𝑑𝑘
+
, 	≤ 𝐻; for 
unenthusiastic consumers, the attention budget constraints are 𝑎()	 ≥ 0 and 
∫ 𝑎()𝑑𝑘
+
, 	≤ 𝐿. Note 𝑎() = 0 if opinion producer k is at a position not reachable by i 
or i chooses 𝑎() = 0 when k is reachable. Let ∫ 𝑎()𝑑𝑖 	= 	𝐴), the total amount of 
attention received by the opinion producer k (who rests at point k).  
 
Consumers at the central position in the social space (at the point 1.5) get no utility 
from opinion producers from [0,1)∪(2,3] and their utility function is  
∫ (1 + 𝐴))"&-(𝑎())-𝑑𝑘
!
"  . 
Note consumers at the point 1.5 have the same utility function, whether they are 
willing to pay H or L units of attention. 
 
We have a few reasons to use this utility function form. First, we use this utility 
function form to capture social influence: the higher 𝐴), the higher is the marginal 
benefit from paying attention to opinion producer k. Note 𝐴) is the total amount of 
attention received by opinion producer k.4 Second, we use (1 + 𝐴))"&- rather than 
 
4 Actually in the utility function for consumer i, A& should be the total amount of attention excluding i’s attention 
received by the opinion producer, but since there is a continuum of knowledge consumers, we can safely drop 
the “excluding i’s attention” in defining A& and assume each consumer takes {A&	|	k ∈ [0, 3]} as given, though 





(𝐴))"&- because we assume there is still some utility for a consumer to follow an 
opinion producer who is followed by nobody else.5 Third, based on this utility 
function, with 𝐴) fixed, consumer i has a decreasing marginal utility from paying 
more attention to k and thus tends to spread attention over many opinion producers. 
This diversification incentive is reasonable. Finally, this function form makes the 
model tractable. 
 
Consumers at point 1 get utility from opinion producers from [0,1] or [1,2] but not 
both. To maximize utility, consumers at point 1 choose whether to pay attention to 
opinion producers from [0,1] or those from [1,2], and in the meanwhile choose the 
amount of attention for each opinion producers. We have this assumption because we 
try to model social influence: consumers at point 1 cannot search or pay attention in 
every direction and which direction to choose is subject to social influence. The 
utility function for consumers at point 1 is  
max{∫ (1 + 𝐴) + 𝑠()"&-(𝑎())-𝑑𝑘
"
, , ∫ (1 + 𝐴))
"&-(𝑎())-𝑑𝑘
!
" } . 
Let’s explain why there is 𝑠( in the utility function. For each consumer at the 
periphery an s is drawn from a uniform distribution over [-t, t] with t>0. This 
parameter magnifies the attention to opinion producers in [0, 1] if s>0, and lessens the 
effect if s<0. Due to symmetry, it does not matter if the extra (positive or negative) 
utility is added for the opinion producers near the center [1, 2] or for those near the 
periphery [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we set t=1. s plays a role of smoothing 
equilibria as will be seen later.6 Also note consumers at point 1 have the same utility 
function, whether they are willing to pay H or L units of attention. 
 
 
5 Here 1 can be changed into any positive number. If consumer utility from an opinion producer who is followed 
by nobody else is zero, there’ll be an infinite number of uninteresting equilibria. 
6 Without s, we have the same theoretical conclusion: the number of opinion leaders and their similarity increase 
in π which, as mentioned above, measures the degree to which enthusiastic knowledge consumers occupy the 
central network position (point 1.5) (and thus it corresponds to r1 and r2 in our regression analysis). But the 
increasing function is a step function, with either no increase (for π below a threshold) or increase to the full 
extent (for π above or equal to a threshold); it’s also possible for the threshold to be zero depending on the 
relative magnitude of H and L. This ad hoc jumpy behavior is avoided by s providing heterogeneity for consumers, 
which we think is more realistic and consistent with the empirical findings and, more importantly, elucidates our 






Using analogous assumptions, the utility function for consumers at point 2 is 
max{∫ (1 + 𝐴) + 𝑠()"&-(𝑎())-𝑑𝑘
+
! , ∫ (1 + 𝐴))
"&-(𝑎())-𝑑𝑘
!
" } . 
Note consumers at point 1 have the same utility function, whether they are willing to 
pay H or L units of attention. 
 
 
2.3 Equilibrium and comparative statics 
With the behavioral assumptions and embeddedness assumptions, we solve for the 
equilibrium, which is summarized in the following. 
(1) Solving for the equilibrium, we find 𝐴). ’s are the same for all k ∈ [1, 2] and let’s 
denote this common value by AC/  (c for center); 𝐴). ’s are the same for all k ∈
[0, 1) ∪ (2, 3] and let’s denote this common value by AC0 (p for periphery). Note 𝐴).  
is the total attention received by opinion producer k not the number of consumers 
following k. 
(2) H-consumers (or L-consumers) from point 1.5 pay H (or L) attention to each 
opinion producers between 1 and 27. H-consumers (or L-consumers) from point 1 
with s < s∗ ≡ AC/ − AC0 pay H (L) attention to each opinion producer between 1 and 
2; H-consumers (or L-consumers) from point 1 with s > s∗ ≡ AC/ − AC0 pay H (or 
L) attention to each opinion producer between 0 and 1. H-consumers (or L-
consumers) from point 2 with s < s∗ ≡ AC/ − AC0  pay H (or L) attention to each 
opinion producer between 1 and 2; H-consumers (or L-consumers) from point 2 
with s > s∗ ≡ AC/ − AC0 pay H (or L) attention to each opinion producer between 2 
and 3. 





 L-consumers are from point 1.5 and that "&%
'
 H-consumers and %
'
 L-
consumers are from point 1 and from point 2 respectively. With these two pieces of 
information combined, the following equations determine AC0 and AC/:  
 
7 Note the measure of opinion producers share H (or L) units of attention is 1, so each opinion producer gets H 







4 × H +
π
4 × LO (1 − [
1
2 × PA
C/ − AC0 + 1Q]) 
	AC/ = J
1 − π
4 × H +
π
4 × LO R
1
2 × PA
C/ − AC0 + 1QS + J
π
2 × H +
1 − π
2 × LO 
 
H>L>0 and (H+L)/2 =1, as assumed above, ensures PAC/ − AC0Q ∈ (−1, 1).  
(4) Combining PAC/ − AC0Q ≡ s∗ and the two equations in (3), we solve for s∗ and get 




 which is increasing in π and belongs to (-1, 1). As will be 
seen soon, s∗ determines how many consumers at the periphery pay attention to 
peripheral (and thus central) opinion producers. 
(5) To simplify notation, let’s assume the CDF of the uniform distribution over [-1, 1] 
for s is G(s). Per (2) and the model setup, the number of consumers pay attention 





G(s∗), while the number of consumers pay attention to the opinion producers in 





G(s∗). With the assumption on opinion producers, the number of opinion leaders 














, which is increasing in G(s∗). Together with 
G(s∗) increasing in s∗ and s∗ increasing with π, we have the following comparative 
statics.  
 
Comparative Statics 1: Increasing π results in more opinion leaders and a 
higher concentration of opinion leaders between point 1 and point 2.  
 




G(s∗) (the number of consumers pay attention 




G(s∗) (the number 
of consumers pay attention to the opinion producers in peripheral regions) 
decreases, and the amount of increase is greater than the amount of decrease. 





followed by the same set of consumers, and less opinion leaders in the peripheral 
regions, who are followed by different consumers. So opinion leaders on average 
have more similarity with each other in terms of who follow them. 
 
Comparative Statics 2: The higher concentration of opinion leaders implies 
more similarity in terms of who follow them.  
 
Thanks to higher ability of increasing 𝐴). , enthusiastic consumers generate more 
social influence to other consumers than unenthusiastic consumers do. Consumers at 
the central region make choices influencing consumers at peripheral regions by 
attracting them to pay attention to opinion producers at the central region. Thus, when 
there are more enthusiastic consumers at the central region, there’ll be higher 
concentration of consumers’ attention into the central region. This concentration leads 
to more and similar opinion leaders as shown in (5) and (6) above.  
 
 
3 Empirical analysis I: data, text analysis, and variable construction 
 
3.1 Data 
We use the data from Hodas and Lerman (2014).8 Hodas and Lerman (2014) 
collected tweets over three weeks in the fall of 2010 and then retained tweets 
containing a URL in the message body. A URL, uniform resource locator, is usually 
in the form of a string of characters or symbols (e.g., http://gd.is/4nfm) that references 
a web resource and specifies its location on a computer network. When a twitter user 
shares a web resource in his tweet, the web address is coded into a short string of 
characters and symbols and shown in the tweet. Thus, a URL can be regarded as a 
meaningful key word more informative about the content or topic of a tweet than 
usual words such as good, the, or, increase, etc. Hodas and Lerman (2014) then 
retrieved all tweets containing these URLs, ensuring the complete tweeting history of 
 






all the URLs, resulting in 3 million tweets in total. They also collected the friend and 
follower information for all tweeting users at the time, resulting in a network with 
almost 700K nodes and over 36M directed edges (an edge is directed from user A to 
user B if user A follows user B). Thus we have URLs in the twitter text but no full 
text contents in the data. Twitter has forbidden using large amounts of text contents 
by external researchers. From Hodas and Lerman (2014), we thus have as our raw 
data a directed network structure, i.e., who follows whom with each Twitter user 
represented by a user id number, and a set of URLs for each user id if the user had 
URLs in his tweets. Since Twitter has changed their way of coding user accounts, we 
don’t know who a user is from his id. 
 
Next in section 3.2 we do topic modeling based on the data. Later we use the resultant 
topics to define knowledge markets. We are interested in the characteristics of 
knowledge markets. In section 3.4 we will define key variables for each knowledge 
market based on network analysis. The variables will be used in the regression 
analysis in section 4, with each knowledge market corresponding to a sample point. 
 
3.2 Topic modeling 
To use topic modeling, we view each user as a document and associated URLs as 
words informative about the topics of the document. We then model topics with the 
correlated topic model (CTM) (Blei and Lafferty, 2006). The CTM is a state-of-the-
art topic modeling method.9 Compared with other commonly used topic models, the 
CTM models a document generating process that exploits more subtleties in the data 
to capture topic correlation. For example, a document about sports is more likely to 
also be about health than international finance (Blei and Lafferty, 2006; Roberts, 
Stewart, and Tingley, 2014). Below we briefly introduce the CTM before showing 
our topic modeling outcomes. For more technical details, applications, and 
comparison of different topic models, please see Blei and Lafferty, (2006) and 
Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley, (2014). 
 
9 Besides, the CTM can be seen as an improved version of the LDA, a very commonly used topic modeling 






The CTM models every document as a distribution over topics with every topic 
modeled as a distribution over words. The CTM thus models a given set of 
documents as generated by a mixture of distributions as elucidated below, and 
estimated parameters of these distributions can be used to estimate topic proportions 
for each document. Specifically, the CTM uses the following generative process for a 
document with length m: 
(1) A K-by-1 vector is drawn. K is the number of topics specified by researchers. 
The vector is drawn from a logistic normal distribution and represents topic 
frequencies (proportions) in a document. The use of a logistic normal 
distribution allows the CTM to capture topic correlation. 
(2) The K-by-1 vector from (1) is used for the parameters of a multinomial 
distribution over K topics. An m-by-1 vector is constructed by randomly 
drawing topics m times from the multinomial distribution, where m is 
document length. Word order in a document does not matter. Each element in 
the m-by-1 vector indicates one topic from the K topics. 
(3) A distribution of words is used for each topic. Specifically, an N-by-1 vector 
is used for each of the K topics and represents the distribution of words in each 
topic. N is the total number of words in all the documents. The elements in the 
vector for a topic correspond to the frequency of each word in the topic.  
(4) For each element that indicates a topic from the m-by-1 vector in (3), a word 
is randomly drawn based on the topic’s word distribution/frequencies 
constructed in (2). The m words thus drawn form a document. 
 
Estimates of the parameters of the logistic normal distribution used in (1) are topic 
proportions for each document (each Twitter user in our case). 
 
The topic modeling outcome 
A Twitter user is regarded as a document. URLs in users’ tweets are regarded as 
words informative about the topics of documents. We’re interested in the number of 





documents that are widely read (i.e., Twitter users that are intensively followed). 
Let’s call Twitter users whose numbers of followers are among the top 0.5% as the 
top 0.5% followees. Specifically, to correspond to the topic model above, we regard 
the top 0.5% followees as documents and their URLs as words.10 Note a Twitter user 
is both a follower and a followee: when we focus on how many users follow a Twitter 
user, the user is a followee; when we focus on who and how many users are followed 
by a Twitter user, the user is a follower. The number of the top 0.5% followees is 
3498, and the followees among them with the fewest followers have 1118 followers 
(these two numbers for top 1% followees are 6985 and 648).  
 
The top 0.5% followees provide the observations for the CTM estimation. This means 
the top 0.5% followees are used as a set of documents and their URLs are used as 
words to be inputted into the CTM. 45 topics result from the CTM. This number of 
topics is chosen using the method introduced by Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 
(2014). Specifically, we experiment with different numbers of topics in the document 
generating process described in section 3.2 (with K from 30 to 100 with a step of 5) 
and randomly leave out a proportion of documents from our sample for out-of-sample 
evaluation. Among the K’s, the numbers of topics, that best or nearly best fit the out-
of-sample documents, we choose the one fitting well with the in-sample documents, 
so the criterion of choosing K takes into account both out-of-sample predictive power 
and in-sample fit. Using the top 0.5% followees and the top 1% both results in the 
topic number of 45.  
 
Many documents have very small estimated topic proportions over some topics. We 
treat a topic proportion as 0 if the topic’s proportion in a document is less than 10%.11 
We have two reasons for this censoring: a very small topic proportion is usually not 
taken seriously in text mining (Robinson and Silge, 2017) since it’s largely a model 
artifact for a better fit. Without getting rid of the small proportions, every document 
includes all topics, and this means the numbers of opinion leaders (we’ll formally 
 
10 The conclusions are the same if we instead us the top 1% as shown in the appendix. 





define opinion leaders in section 3.4) are almost the same for all topics, which is 
neither interesting nor realistic.  
 
Based on the topic modeling outcomes and the network structure, we’ll define key 
variables for regression analysis in section 4. But before that, in order to be clear 
about what corresponds to an observation or a sample point in the regression analysis, 
let’s first introduce the network community detection technique we use to separate 
networks into different sub-networks: this turns out to give us a panel data structure. 
 
3.3 Network Community Detection 
How things work in Hobbits’ Shire can be quite different from that among Gandalf’s 
wizard friends (Tolkien, 1955). A very large social network can consist of several 
nearly isolated sub-networks each of which may be better regarded as a relatively 
isolated kingdom. A sub-field of network science, community detection, focuses on 
dividing a network into communities within which nodes are densely connected and 
between which nodes are sparsely connected (Thurner, Hanel, and Klimek, 2018; 
Newman, 2018). We use a state-of-the-art network community detection method 
(Clauset, Newman, and Moore, 2004; Csardi, 2019) with especially good 
performance for very large networks as is the present case. We divide the Twitter 
network into communities. We find nearly all the top 0.5% followees (more than 
95%) are in four communities. 1494, 439, 798, and 601 of the top 0.5% followees are 
respectively in the four communities and 174 are in other communities. 
Approximately 94% of links among all the links directed toward and away from the 
nodes of these four communities are within communities. We think the four 
communities can be regarded as relatively isolated kingdoms. Of course, the 94% is 
not 100%, so we’ll use some econometric techniques to mitigate this concern in 
section 4.  
 
We’ll briefly explain the community detection method soon, but let’s now explain the 
purpose of doing community detection. We have two reasons. First, with this 





regression analysis are topic-community specific, i.e., an observation or a sample 
point in our regression analysis corresponds to a topic in a community. This gives us 
a panel data structure. Second, it’s reasonable to assume consumers from different 
communities behave differently, as is shown by Reddy, Kitsuregawa, Sreekanth, and 
Rao (2002) who use a similar network community detection method to identify 
consumers with similar interests and purchasing habits.  
 
Let’s now briefly talk about the underlying logic of community detection. For more 
technical details and applications, see Thurner, Hanel, and Klimek, (2018), Newman 
(2018), and Clauset, Newman, and Moore (2004). We first transform the Twitter 
network into an undirected network. So there is an undirected link between Twitter 
user i and Twitter user j when there is a directed link from i to j or from j to i or when 
there are two directed links in both directions. L denotes the total number of such 
undirected links. AU56 = 1 if there is an undirected link between i and j. Let’s define k5	 
as the number of network neighbors of node i in the undirected network. (Two nodes 
are network neighbors of each other if they are connected in the network.) δ56 = 1 if i 
and j are assigned into the same community; otherwise, δ56 = 0. Note if the network 
is generated randomly lacking community structure, the probability that AU56 = 1 is 
given by 7/70
!4
. The community detection method we use chooses who are in what 
communities and the number of communities by maximizing a modularity score, Q, 











Intuitively, this score compares the actual network to random networks that lack 
community structure. Specifically, the score compares AU56 (the actual presence of a 
link) and 7/70
!4
 (the probability of the presence of a link if the network is generated 





community assignment, the number of with-in community links (picked out by δ56 =
1) is larger than the expected number of links generated from a random network that 
lacks community structure.  
 
3.4 Key variables for regression analysis 
Based on the above community detection and topic modeling, let’s define key 
variables used for the regression analysis in section 3.  
 
In order to define the following variables, we now specify what we mean by opinion 
leaders. If a Twitter user (1) belongs to the top 0.5% followees,12 (2) has a topic 
proportion greater than 10% on topic j, and (3) belongs to network community k, he 
is an opinion leader for topic j in network community k. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the observations used for the CTM and those used 
for regression analysis are different. In the CTM, each Twitter user in the top 0.5% 
followees is an observation (i.e., each of these users is regarded as a document and 
the URLs in his tweets regarded as words). In the regression analysis in section 4, 
each observation is a knowledge market uniquely pinned down by a community-topic 
pair. Then for topic j in network community k (i.e., for the knowledge market 
defined by j and k), we define the following variables. 
 
1. N67: the number of opinion leaders for topic j in community k. 
The number of opinion leaders for a topic in a community is the number of top 0.5% 
followees who are in this community and whose topic proportions are greater than 
10% in this topic. (In the appendix, we report outcomes with other choices of these 
two thresholds, where the conclusions are the same.) 
 
2. S6758: the average similarity of opinion leaders for topic j in community k in terms of 
who follow them. 
 





Based on Adamic and Adar (2003), we define the average similarity of opinion 
leaders in terms of who follow them by the average of the in-degree Jaccard similarity 
coefficients of all pairs of the opinion leaders for a topic in a community. The in-
degree Jaccard similarity coefficient of a pair of opinion leaders for topic j in 
community k is the number of users in community k following both opinion leaders 
divided by the number of users in community k following at least one of the opinion 
leaders.  
 
3. f67: the total amount of attention (divided by 1000) to all the opinion leaders for 
topic j in community k paid by their followers. 
First, starting from all the opinion leaders for topic j in community k, we find the set 
of all the Twitter users in this community following them excluding the opinion 
leaders themselves. Second, for each member of this set, say, follower m, we sum his 
opinion leaders’ topic proportions in this topic (j), and define follower m’s attention 
to this topic (j) in this community (k) as this sum, denoted by f967. Finally, we sum 
the attention of all such followers for this topic in this community and divide it by 
1000 to get f67 =	
∑ ;1021
",,,
. The 1000 will make the estimates in section 4 look simple. 
 
4. r167: for topic j in community k, the weighted average in-degree centrality (divided 
by 1000) of followers who pay more than median attention to the opinion leaders. 
Intuitively, r167 is a weighted sum of how central the network positions taken by 
enthusiastic knowledge consumers. It thus corresponds to π in the model, the degree 
to which enthusiastic followers take central positions in a network. Specifically, we 
define it in the following way. First, as defined above, the in-degree centrality of a 
Twitter user is the number of users following him. To measure how central is a 
network position occupied by a user, we calculate his in-degree centrality in this 
community k (note each community can be viewed as a separate network.). Second, 
note we have each follower’s attention for a topic in a community (f967) when we 
define f67	in 4. We then define Ω67 as consisting of the followers whose attention is 





follower m ∈ Ω67 we denote his in-degree centrality in community k by ID97. We 
then define r167 by averaging the in-degree centralities weighted by each follower’s 
attention per the following equation and then divide the average by 1000 to make the 
regression estimates in section 4 look simple. 
r167 =	





Note users who pay more attention receive larger weights in this average. This 
corresponds to π in the theory (after controlling for f67) and is our major explanatory 
variable in the regression analysis. In the rest of this paper, we call followers who pay 
more than median attention enthusiastic followers or enthusiastic knowledge 
consumers.  
 
5. r267: for topic j in community k, the weighted average eigenvector centrality of 
followers who pay more than median attention to the opinion leaders. 
In defining r167, we use the in-degree centrality of a user that counts how many 
people follow him. It is intuitive and reasonable, but we can exploit more subtlety in 
the network: for a user, some of his followers may be followed by many people while 
his other followers may be followed by a few. The eigenvector centrality extends in-
degree centrality and takes into account this heterogeneity among a user’s followers 
to evaluate the user centrality in a network: ceteris paribus, users whose followers are 
more followed are more central.13 Below we define r267 using the eigenvector 
 
13 Formally, when an user’s centrality is regarded as correlated with the sum of his followers’ centralities, the 
eigenvector centrality, x', of user i can be defined from x' =	κ$#∑ A('( x(, where A(' = 1 if j follows i (to calculate 
eigenvector centrality for undirected networks, the same formula is used with A(' = 1 if there is a link between j 
and i). κ is a scalar whose role will be seen soon. Putting the eigenvector centralities of all users into a vector, x, 
one gets A)x = κx. x is thus a eigenvector of A). Per Perron-Frobenius theorem, for an adjacency matrix from a 
connected network only the leading eigenvector is non-negative. Note each community is a connected network. 
Eigenvector centralities, usually assumed to be non-negative, are thus given by the leading eigenvector of A). 
However, there is an undesirable property for using eigenvector centrality for directed networks. People without 
followers have zero eigenvector centrality. Per the definition of eigenvector centrality, anyone who is followed 





centrality. We’ll use r267 and r167 separately as our major explanatory variable in 
regression analysis in section 4: this strategy can be viewed as a robust check. 
 
With f967 defined above in 4 and with the eigenvector centrality (defined in footnote 
14) for each follower (m) in a community (k) denoted by EC97. We define r267 per 
the following equation. 
r267 =	
∑ (f967 × EC97)9∈=02
∑ f9679∈=02
 





6. r1iv67: for topic j in community k, the average in-degree centrality (divided by 1000) 
of followers in the friendship network who pay more than median attention to all 
the opinion leaders.  
This is constructed in the same principle as r167 with the in-degree centrality 
calculated based on the friendship network. The friendship network is constructed by 
dropping any directed link without a reciprocal of it, i.e., a link from i to j is dropped 
if there is no link from j to i. In the four communities under focus, the numbers of 
user pairs connected in the friendship networks (undirected networks) are respectively 
30%, 44%, 20%, and 55% of the numbers of user pairs connected with at least one 
directed link in corresponding community networks (directed networks). When we do 
regression analysis in next section, we’ll explain why and how this can serve as an 
instrument for r1. 
 
7. r2iv67: for topic j in community k, the average eigenvector centrality of followers 
in the friendship network who pay more than median attention to all the opinion 
leaders.  
 
zero-centrality users have zero eigenvector centrality. However, in our case the impact from this property can be 
ignored since such users account for only around 1% of users in each community. For technical details, please see 





This is constructed in the same principle as r267 with the eigenvector centrality 
calculated based on the friendship network. When we do regression analysis in next 
section, we’ll explain why and how this can serve as an instrument for r2. 
 
With these variables defined and with 45 topics from topic modeling and four 
communities from network community detection, we do regression analysis in the 
next section and present our empirical findings. The summary statistics for each 
variable are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: summary statistics for variables used in the regression analysis 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
N 50.3 127.9 
S58 0.111 0.115 
r1 0.212 0.131 
r2 0.066 0.061 
f 69.4 192.9 
r1iv 0.156 0.109 
r2iv 0.062 0.059 
 
 
4 Empirical analysis II: panel data analyses based network communities 
From section 3, we have a data structure with each observation corresponding to a 
topic-community pair. With 45 topics from topic modeling and four communities 
from network community detection, we construct a panel data set as detailed in 
section 3. The top 0.5% followees are distributed across different communities and 
the top 0.5% followees (documents) within a community may not cover all topics, 
that is, not all topics appear in all communities: 9 topics appear in all of the four 





the four communities, and 10 topics in only one of the four communities.14 So the 
data structure turns out to be an unbalanced panel with 99 observations. Compared to 
standard panel data, topic corresponds to individual and community to time. 
 
4.1 Panel data analysis without instruments 
In this section we have regression equations like the following: 
𝐲𝐣𝐤 = 𝛃 × 𝐱𝐣𝐤 + 𝛄 × 𝐟𝐣𝐤 +	𝛍𝐣 +	𝛒𝐤 +	𝛆𝐣𝐤. 
In all the regression analyses in this paper, each observation is a knowledge market 
uniquely pinned down by a community-topic pair such as topic j and community k. 
As normal, β and γ are coefficients, and ε67 is the error term. We run two-way fixed 
effect regressions controlling for topic fixed effects (µ6) and community fixed effects 
(ρ7). In section 3.4 we have defined the variables to be used in the regressions and we 
now explain how the variables are to be used. 
 
y67 will be either N67 (the number of opinion leaders for topic j in community k) or 
S6758 (the similarity of opinion leaders for topic j in community k in terms of who 
follow them). 
 
x67 is the primary explanatory variable and will be r167 (a thousandth of the average 
in-degree centrality of enthusiastic followers for topic j in community k) or r267 (the 
average eigenvector centrality of enthusiastic followers for topic j in community k). 
The similarity and difference between these two variables are discussed above. We 
separately use these two as robustness checks. Note r1 and r2 correspond to π in the 
theory in section 2, capturing in different ways how central enthusiastic consumers’ 
network positions are. So our theoretical conclusion in section 2 corresponds to 
significant positive coefficients of x67 with the dependent variables N67 and S6758. 
Recall our theoretical conclusion in section 2: in a knowledge market when 
 
14 Note the sum of these four numbers is 41 rather than 44. This is because for some topics in some communities, 
there is only one opinion leader. The values for S'*, S'*, r1, r2, r1iv, and r2iv are NAs when there is only one 





enthusiastic consumers on average occupy more central positions in a network 
connecting consumers, more opinion producers become opinion leaders and there is 
more similarity among opinion leaders in terms of who pay attention to them.  
 
We also control for f67 (the total amount of follower attention (divided by 1000) to all 
the opinion leaders for topic j in community k), because in our theory we fix this 
amount and only focus on changes in π. Moreover, a high total amount of attention 
can result in a large number of opinion leaders in a topic due to high demand, while 
the total amount of attention may also correlate with the network structure in some 
unknown way that might make it correlate with our key explanatory variables. So we 
treat it as a potential confounding variable and control for it. 
 
We use the Arellano covariance estimator to estimate standard errors (Croissant and 
Millo, 2008; Arellano, 1987) for the following reason. The time dimension for a 
standard panel data analysis corresponds to community membership in our data 
(while each topic is an individual). The network community detection technique has 
done its best to divide a network into 4 communities, but there are still links between 
communities,15 and error terms can be correlated across communities. So we use the 
Arellano estimator that takes into account serial correlation of arbitrary form; time 
has an order where some AR process may be imposed, while community membership 
cannot be ordered, so an arbitrary form is in need. Besides, for short panel (there are 
only 4 communities) the Arellano estimator is usually advisable (Croissant and Millo, 
2008). 
 
The regression results with three dependent variables and two alternative explanatory 
variables are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
  
 
15 As noted above, about 94% of links among all the links directed toward to and away from the nodes in these 





Table 2: The effect of enthusiastic consumers’ centrality on the number of 
opinion leaders and their similarity: OLS and r1 
 Dependent Variables 
 N S58 
r1 (how central enthusiastic consumers 





f (a thousandth of the total amount of 





1. Here we use the top 0.5% followees in topic modeling, use 10% as the topic proportion 
threshold, use median attention to define enthusiastic consumers, and use the in-degree 
centrality to measure how central enthusiastic consumers are. 
2. We control the total amount of attention to a topic in a community (f!"), topic fixed effects, and 
community fixed effects.  
3. The data structure is an unbalanced panel with 99 observations. Compared with standard panel 
data, topic corresponds to individual and community to time. 
4. We use Arellano covariance estimator to estimate standard errors (Croissant and Millo, 2008; 
Arellano, 1987) 
5. Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis of zero effect; significance code: 
* for 0.1, ** for 0.05, *** for 0.01. 
 
Table 3: The effect of enthusiastic consumers’ centrality on the number of 
opinion leaders and their similarity: OLS with r2 
 Dependent Variables 
 N S58 
r2 (how central enthusiastic consumers 





f (a thousandth of the total amount of 





1. Here we use the top 0.5% followees in topic modeling, use 10% as the topic proportion 
threshold, use median attention to define enthusiastic consumers, and use the eigenvector 
centrality to measure how central enthusiastic consumers are. 
2. We control the total amount of attention to a topic in a community (f!"), topic fixed effects, and 
community fixed effects. 
3. The data structure is an unbalanced panel with 99 observations. Compared with standard panel 
data, topic corresponds to individual and community to time. 
4. We use Arellano covariance estimator to estimate standard errors (Croissant and Millo, 2008; 
Arellano, 1987) 
5. Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis of zero effect; significance code: 






The regression outcomes are in table 2 and table 3. The conclusion is summarized 
below: 
 
Controlling for topic fixed effects, community fixed effects, and the total amount 
of attention to a topic in a community (f67), we find there tend to be more opinion 
leaders (larger N67) and the opinion leaders tend to be more similar in terms of who 
follow them (larger S6758), when enthusiastic followers (who pay more than median 
attention to all opinion leaders of a topic in a community) occupy more central 
network positions as measured by r1 and r2. 
 
A remark on the magnitude of the effects 
A back-of-envelope calculation based on the information from Table 1-3 gives the 
following effect magnitudes. Increasing r1 by one standard deviation increases N by 
approximately 0.1 standard deviations and increases S58 by approximately 0.3 
standard deviations. Increasing r2 by one standard deviation increases N by 
approximately 0.1 standard deviations and increases S58 by approximately 0.5 
standard deviations. The scale of these effects suggests that the estimates capture 
economically important phenomena. How to evaluate these effect magnitudes needs 
further investigation because the number of opinion leaders follows a fat tail 
distribution and we don’t know how important an increase of 0.1 standard deviations 
in the number of opinion leader is for opinion diversity. 
 
4.2 Panel data analysis with instruments: 2SLS 
In this section we use r1iv and r2iv as instruments for r1 and r2 to do 2SLS. The 
second stage regression equations are the same as the regression equations in section 
4.1 except that r1 and r2 are substituted with their first stage fitted values. The first 
stage regression equations are as follows: 
 






As in section 4.1, x67 will be r167 (a thousandth of the average in-degree centrality of 
enthusiastic followers for topic j in community k) or r267 (the average eigenvector 
centrality of enthusiastic followers for topic j in community k) with xiv67 being r1iv 
and r2iv respectively. ΒU and γv are coefficients and εv67 is the error term in the first 
stage. µv 6 and		ρv7	are topic and community fixed effects in the first stage. Let’s now 
explain why the outcomes from using r1iv and r2iv as instruments are informative.  
 
Though it’s hard to imagine a story that more opinion leaders or more similarity 
among the opinion leaders leads to enthusiastic followers occupying more central 
network positions, or to imagine a story that a third factor leads to the correlation 
between our dependent and explanatory variables, r1 and r2 may be subject to an 
endogeneity concern because the network structure may be endogenous in a way that 
confounds our estimates, even after we’ve controlled for topic fixed effects, 
community fixed effects, and the total amount of attention to a topic in a community. 
So we use r1iv and r2iv as instruments which, compared with r1 and r2, are defined 
based on the friendship network rather than the original network (please refer to 
section 3 for definition details). The logic of using the friendship network as an 
instrument is explained in the following.  
 
If I follow you but you don’t follow me, it’s highly possible that I regard you as a 
knowledge source. If I follow you and you also follow me, it’s still possible that I 
regard you as a knowledge source, but it’s also possible that we have a mutual 
relationship merely because of friendship. Thus the key point is that the friendship 
network should be exogenous or subject to the endogeneity concern to a lesser 
degree.16 To put this in another way, some unknown interaction of topic 
characteristics and community characteristics might have an impact on both the 
number of opinion leaders and enthusiastic consumers’ network positions determined 
by the original network, but the position measures based on the friendship network 
 





are unlikely to subject to this endogeneity concern since it is mainly driven by 
friendship.  
 
Of course, we don’t know if the friendship network is actually totally exogenous to 
the knowledge market activities, but we don’t need this absolute exogeneity. 
Importantly, significant positive effects from 2SLS are not very informative in 
themselves, but significant positive 2SLS outcomes being insignificantly different 
from (statistically equivalent to) the outcomes in section 4.1 are informative and tell 
us that the endogeneity concern can be ignored. Our logic is this: under the 
assumption that the friendship network is subject to an endogeneity concern to a 
lesser degree than the original network is, the outcome based on friendship network is 
significantly different from that based on the whole network if the endogeneity were 
really a serious concern. The contrapositive of this logic is this: under the assumption 
that the friendship network is subject to an endogeneity concern to a lesser degree 
than the original network is, if the outcome based on friendship network is not 
significantly different from that based on the whole network, the endogeneity is not a 
concern. Later we do Wald tests testing the statistical equivalence between the 
coefficients of the primary explanatory variables in OLS and 2SLS and fail to reject 
the equivalence, so endogeniety is not a problem in our case. More details for this 






Table 4: The effect of enthusiastic consumers’ centrality on the number of 
opinion leaders and their similarity: 2SLS with r1iv instrumenting r1 
 Dependent Variables 
 N S58 
r1 (how central enthusiastic consumers 





f (a thousandth of the total amount of 





The first stage F-statistics for excluded iv is 1600 
1. Here we use the top 0.5% followees in topic modeling, use 10% as the topic proportion 
threshold, use median attention to define enthusiastic consumers, and use the in-degree 
centrality to measure how central enthusiastic consumers are. 
2. We control the total amount of attention to a topic in a community (f!"), topic fixed effects, and 
community fixed effects. 
3. The data structure is an unbalanced panel with 99 observations. Compared with standard panel 
data, topic corresponds to individual and community to time. 
4. We use Arellano covariance estimator to estimate standard errors (Croissant and Millo, 2008; 
Arellano, 1987) 
5. Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis of zero effect; significance code: 







Table 5: The effect of enthusiastic consumers’ centrality on the number of 
opinion leaders and their similarity: 2SLS with r2iv instrumenting r2 
 Dependent Variables 
 N S58 
r2 (how central enthusiastic consumers 





f (a thousandth of the total amount of 





The first stage F-statistics for excluded iv is 1000 
1. Here we use the top 0.5% followees in topic modeling, use 10% as the topic proportion 
threshold, use median attention to define enthusiastic consumers, and use eigenvector centrality 
to measure how central enthusiastic consumers are. 
2. We control the total amount of attention to a topic in a community (f!"), topic fixed effects, and 
community fixed effects. 
3. The data structure is an unbalanced panel with 99 observations. Compared with standard panel 
data, topic corresponds to individual and community to time. 
4. We use Arellano covariance estimator to estimate standard errors (Croissant and Millo, 2008; 
Arellano, 1987) 
5. Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis of zero effect; significance code: 
* for 0.1, ** for 0.05, *** for 0.01. 
 
 
Note as shown in section 3, in the four communities under focus which contain 
almost all opinion leaders, the numbers of user pairs connected in the friendship 
networks (undirected networks) are respectively 30%, 44%, 20%, and 55% of the 
numbers of user pairs connected with at least one directed link in corresponding 
community networks (directed networks). So the friendship network, though highly 
“correlated” with the original network, is very different. Finally, the first-stage F 
statistics for excluded IV is much greater than 10, so the biases toward OLS of the 
2SLS estimates can be safely ignored.  
 
Table 6 below shows results from Wald tests testing the statistical equivalence 
between the coefficients of the primary explanatory variables in OLS and 2SLS. We 





statistical equivalence is not resulted from imprecise estimations as shown above in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
Table 6: Equivalence tests with null hypotheses that OLS and 2SLS coefficients 
of the primary explanatory variables are equivalent. 
p-values for Wald tests 
with H0: OLS = 2SLS 
N S58 
r1/r1iv 0.278 0.792 
r2/r2iv 0.396 0.629 
Note: Here we use the top 0.5% followees in topic modeling, use 
10% as the topic proportion threshold, and use median attention 
to define enthusiastic consumers. 
 
 
The regression outcomes are in Table 4-6. The conclusion is summarized below: 
 
Controlling for topic fixed effects, community fixed effects, and the total amount 
of attention to a topic in a community (f67), and using r1iv and r2iv to instrument for 
r1 and r2 respectively, we get estimated effects insignificantly different from their 
counterparts in section 4.2. First-stages are strong. This insignificant difference is not 




As said above, in the main text we report outcomes from using the top 0.5% 
followees’ tweets for topic modeling and using the top 0.5% followees and the 10% 
topic proportion threshold to defining opinion leaders.17 The conclusions are the 
same, when we try every combination of the top 1% and o.5% followees with 10% 
and 20% topic proportion thresholds. Besides, we have used median to define r1, r2, 
 
17 When a top followee’s topic proportion on a topic is smaller than 10%, we treat the topic proportion as zero; 





r1iv, and r2iv, but the conclusions are the same if we use mean instead of median 
(again for every combination of the top 1% and o.5% followees with 10% and 20% 
topic proportion thresholds). So together with r1 and r2 skinning the same cat in two 
different ways, we’ve checked robustness across 16 combinations. The only 
exception is when we regress the number of opinion leaders on r2 with and without 
instrument using top 1% followee, 20% topic proportion threshold, and median. 
There the two estimates of interest associate with p-values greater than 0.1. Given 
that the robustness is checked across many possibilities, we think this single fish 
won’t spoil the whole pond. Details are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
5 Discussion: methodology reflection and what can be done in the future 
So far we have done with the economic and econometric content of this paper. Before 
conclusion in the next section, we here highlight some methodological points in this 
paper that we think may offer other researchers something new. 
 
A multi-layer network perspective: IV based on friendship network 
In the regression analysis we use measures defined based on a friendship network as 
instrument variables for those based on the original network. We’ve talked about our 
logic in section 4. Now let’s try to be general. People live their lives simultaneously in 
different networks or in a network with many layers, e.g., a network based on friendship 
(a friendship layer) and a network based on financial relationship (a finance layer). 
Though different layers can be deeply interacted with each other, each layer should be 
able to provide exogenous variation for another layer to some degree. Of course, the 
use of a multi-layer network structure for economics and econometrics is more than 
providing instrument variables. For technical tools and applications in the field of 
multilayer networks, please see Bianconi (2018). 
 
Network community and panel data 
Network community detection is a well developed sub-field in network science 





no one has applied this technique to construct a panel data structure for econometric 
analysis. We do this not only because what happens in isolated communities should be 
disentangled, but also because panel data structure improves identification. 
 
An embeddedness perspective 
A rudimental disagreement between the paradigm of economics and that of sociology 
is that economist assumes people do rational calculation and sociologists see people as 
societal construction whose behavior is a function of their social embeddedness 
(Grannovetter, 1985; Grannovetter 2017). We think that why and how people do 
maximization can be a function of social contexts and that social influence can exist 
due to people’s maximization. So, in the sense that “All models are wrong, but some 
are useful” (Box, 1976), it’s pointless to argue which paradigm is more fundamental. 
To be useful, our model rests at the middle point of the two: we model rational agents 
socially embedded in a specific way. Moreover, we think it can be fruitful in many 
research contexts to be specific about agents’ social embeddedness, though network 
effects are usually modeled as well-stirred interactions (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015). 
 
What can be done in the future? 
First, in this paper we focus on the number of opinion leaders. We assume more 
opinion leaders lead to opinion diversity in knowledge markets and such diversity can 
enhance adaptive efficiency for a system. To prove “the more opinion leaders the 
better” requires criteria for qualifying opinions. We haven’t seen any such criteria in 
the academic world. Such evaluation can help answering many interesting questions 
in the future. Second, we make simple assumptions on the supply side. We think it’s 
important for future research to explore subtleties on the supply side of knowledge 
markets where suppliers face a very different incentive structure than usual 
commodity, service, or factor suppliers do. Finally, what we have is a decentralization 
story, where enthusiastic consumers in central network positions can be loosely 
regarded as a self-organized centralized propaganda tool that announces which 





interesting to explore what forces drive enthusiastic consumers to and away from 




What we find in this work can be summarized as follows: there’ll be more opinion 
leaders in a knowledge market if the most active knowledge consumers occupy more 
central positions in a social network connecting consumers. Ceteris paribus, the 
structure of consumer interactions matters. Compared with existing literature on 
network effects, the network effects explored in this paper are non-homogenously 
networked rather than well-stirred. This is a feature of both our theoretical and 
empirical parts. Moreover, understanding knowledge markets, especially formally 
understanding what impacts the number of opinion leaders and formally 
understanding the sources of opinion diversity, is a less explored field. The key 
variables both in our theory and in our empirical work are dealt with only intuitively 
in the existing literature. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to 
formally define opinion leaders, knowledge consumers, and amount of attention. Last 
but not least, the paper makes some methodological contributions by constructing a 
new type of IV based on a multi-layer network perspective, by using network 
community detection techniques to construct a panel data structure, and by 





Appendix: robustness check 
 
 
Table A1: the main results (top 0.5% followee, 10% threshold, mean) 
 N S58 





































Table A2: the main results (top 0.5% followee, 20% threshold, median) 
 N S58 









































Table A3: the main results (top 0.5% followee, 20% threshold, mean) 
 N S58 
1st-stage F  
for excluded IV 
Statistically 


































Table A4: the main results (top 1% followee, 10% threshold, median) 
 N S58 










































Table A5: the main results (top 1% followee, 10% threshold, mean) 
 N S58 
1st-stage F  
for excluded IV 
Statistically 


































Table A6: the main results (top 1% followee, 20% threshold, median) 
 N S58 
1st-stage F  
for excluded IV 
Statistically 








































Table A7: the main results (top 1% followee, 20% threshold, mean) 
 N S58 
1st-stage F  
for excluded IV 
Statistically 














































In designing any causal study, steps must be taken to address both internal and 
external threats to its validity (see Campbell, 1957, and Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
Researchers tend to focus primarily on threats to internal validity, i.e., determining 
whether it is valid to infer that, within the context of a particular study, the 
differences in the dependent variables are caused by the differences in the relevant 
explanatory variables. External validity, on the other hand, concerns the extent to 
which a causal relationship holds over variations in persons, settings, and time. It is 
important to underscore the fact at the outset that external validity does not extend to 
modifications in the treatment, although, in practice, researchers often try to 
generalize their results by conflating the two levels of generalization into a question 
of external validity.  
 
Randomized controlled trials solve the problem of selection bias in the identification 
of causal effects. Thus, theoretically, cause-effect constructs identified by means of 
randomized controlled trials are internally valid, that is, they permit the identification 
of causal effects for the population from which the random sample used in the 
estimation was drawn. The outcomes of such experiments are interesting in their own 
right, but researchers sometimes explicitly assume external validity (EV), i.e., that the 
internally valid estimates obtained for one population can be extrapolated to other 
populations. In fact, it is not uncommon that, after researchers have established a 
cause-and-effect relationship in a specific population, they proceed to discuss its 
implications based on the assumption that this relationship is generally valid. In this 
paper, we formalize the concept of external validity and show that, in general, it is 





reason why Manski (2013) says that the current practice of policy analysis “hides 
uncertainty”.  
 
Once researchers have conducted an internally valid analysis, that analysis yields an 
established set of findings for the specific case in question. As for the future 
usefulness of that result, however, what matters is its degree of EV. The most 
commonly held view in this regard is that the EV problem hinges on assumptions 
about the relationship between the population for which internally valid estimates 
have been obtained and another, different population. Apart from researchers who are 
focusing on EV in a specific context, many researches either ignore the EV problem 
altogether or approach it subjectively. In this paper, we provide a formal and general 
reflection on the EV problem and propose a simple and generally applicable method 
for evaluating the external validity of randomly controlled trials (RCTs). 
 
In this paper we define external validity as the stability of the conditional distribution 
p(outcome | treatment) across different populations. We then formalize the degree to 
which we can make judgments about a new population (density) generated as a 
subpopulation from an overarching population that also  
generates the ‘original’ population studied for which there is an internally valid 
estimate. Without loss of generality, assume that we have data that allows estimation 
of the joint distribution p(outcome, treatment). We then have p(outcome, treatment) = 
p(outcome | treatment) × p(treatment). Then, we say that there is external validity if 
for other data with a potentially different joint distribution of outcome and treatment, 
the conditional distribution p(outcome | treatment) stays the same.  
 
Based on our framework, we then propose two alternative measures of external 
validity. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose formal 
mathematical definitions of external validity and, on that basis and in the context of 






Ultimately, the external validity of all causal estimates is established by replication in 
other datasets (Angrist, 2004).18 Nevertheless, we would like to determine whether a 
given specific study can be generalized to other populations.19 In this paper we 
propose a method to do precisely that. Our method applies to RCTs, but it should be 
noted that the issue of external validity is general and not restricted to RCTs, as 
shown in our formal and general reflection below. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a formal and 
general reflection on the EV problem. Based on the model described in that section, 
in Section 3 we propose a simple and generally applicable method for assessing the 
external validity of RCTs. Finally, we present final remarks. 
      
 
2. External Validity 
A single experiment allows us to arrive at a point estimate for the population of 
cause-effect parameters. Assessing the EV of one causal parameter entails estimating 
treatment effects as a function of different populations. Thus, evaluating the EV of an 
internally valid estimate of a cause-effect parameter entails assessing a distribution of 
cause-effect parameters based on a single draw from it.  
 
In this section, we formalize the concept of EV. We develop our framework in terms 
of population density functions because nearly all sample analyses are intended to 
characterize an underlying population. Thus, we assume it is always possible to 
 
18 In the areas of labor and development economics, a number of studies use similar multi-country strategies to 
generalize cause-and-effect constructs. For example, Cruces and Galiani (2007) examine the effects of fertility on 
labor outcomes in three countries; Dehejia, Pop-Eleches, and Samii (2019) examine the causal effects of sibling 
sex composition on fertility and labor supply across many countries and years and characterize how its effects 
vary in terms of available covariates; Banerjee et al. (2015) study microcredit in six countries; Galiani et al. (2017) 
study the effects of sheltering the poor in three countries; Gertler et al. (2015) study health promotion in four 
countries; Dupas et al. (2016) examine the effects of opening savings accounts in three different countries; and 
Galiani et al. (2016) investigate slum upgrading in three countries. 
 
19 For example, Deaton (2010) writes: “We need to know when we can use local results, from instrumental 







obtain consistent estimates of the joint density of outcomes and treatment status or the 
conditional density of outcomes conditional on treatment status. Focusing on 
population densities might seem unnecessary, since most researchers need to model 
only the first and second moments of a population (density) to obtain their parameters 
of interest. The first moment is needed for a point estimate, while the second moment 
is used for evaluating sampling variability. Nevertheless, both moments are a function 
of a population density, i.e., a density of outcomes conditional on treatment status. 
We focus on population densities here because we want to emphasize that the nature 
and difficulty of assessing EV lies in the differences among populations. In addition, 
at a conceptual level, this simplifies the analysis, since it is necessary to make 
comparisons for only one entity (the density) instead of two (the first and second 
moments).  
     
2.1. From one population to another 
Conducting external inference from internally valid estimates entails switching the 
population under study. Assume that there is an overarching population that consists 
of all vectors (y, z, w) from the probability density D(y, z, w;	θ). Also assume that we 
obtain a sample from a subpopulation defined by the density D(y, z;	w = w,, θ). 
When we say something, based on estimates from this sample, about another 
subpopulation defined by the density D(y, z;	w = w", θ), for some	w" ≠ w,, we are 
conducting external inference.  
 
This is the general setup: w defines, in a general way, the difference between 
populations; internally valid inferences will usually yield different estimates of the 
cause-effect constructs of interest. θ governs how the differences in w affect those 
constructs across populations. Alternatively, we could define different populations by 
assuming that their w’s are distributed in different ranges instead of assuming that 
they take different point values, but this change would not add any insight to the 






w, is a given realization of w and is constant for the subpopulation for which the 
sample is used to conduct the empirical analysis. For example, if we draw a sample 
within a country, all different sample points have the same country identity (w,). 
With the sample drawn from D(y, z;	w = w,, θ), whether we estimate the joint 
density of (y, z) or a conditional density of y on z, we always conduct inference under 
the condition w =	w,. Then, conducting external inference implies assessing whether 
such estimates are valid for a different population (in our example, from another 
country), characterized by w = w".  
 
Researchers generally do not have information about how changing w would change 
the density D(y, z, w;	θ). Usually, they have to make assumptions in this regard in 
order to conduct external inference. We now explore this question formally. It is 
informative to express D(y, z;	w = w,, θ) as follows:  
 
D(y, z;w = w,, θ) = D(y|z; θ"(w,, θ) × D(z; θ!(w,, θ)) 
 
Assume that the estimand is the conditional density D(y|z;	θ"(w,, θ)). In the case of 
an RCT, the marginal density D(z; θ!(w,, θ)) can be ignored, since z is randomly 
assigned. Thus, assume we estimate DPyz;	θ"(w,, θ)Q and then want to know how 
well we would assess another population characterized as w = w" if we rely only on 
our internally valid estimate. Assuming the conditional density function is 
differentiable almost everywhere with respect to w and applying the mean value 
theorem, we obtain:   
 











where w@ takes a value between	w"	and	w,. If w" is not known but can be assumed 





Taylor expansion is negligible). Then, for a close w", the more sensitive the 
conditional density with respect to w is, the more we will miss the target while 
conducting external inference by relying only on an internally valid estimate of the 
estimand of interest in our sample. Importantly, this is independent of the sample size.  
  
Relying on this setup, we define: 
 
(1) Punctual local external validity when	w" = w,; 





)!𝑑𝑦 = 0 for all w" within 
a small interval of w,; 





)!𝑑𝑦 = 0 for all w"; 






)!𝑑𝑦, either known or estimable that can be used to adjust 
DPyz;	θ"(w,, θ)Q to calculate DPyz;	θ"(w", θ)Q. 
 
In the literature, researchers conducting external inference have attempted to either 
test (1), (2), or (3) or to exploit (4). As our discussion makes clear, the question of 
external validity rests on the relationship between the population for which we have 
an internally valid estimate and the population about which we are to make 





)!𝑑𝑦 formalizes this 
relationship.  
 
2.2. From one population to any population 
We now extend our analysis. The estimand is a conditional model based on data 
generated from the density D(y, z;	w = w,, θ). We denote the conditional model by 
D(y	|	z; 	w = w,, θ"), where θ" is the parameter governing the conditional model and 





(see Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983) for θ (this is always the case when z is 
randomly assigned), we have:  
 
D(y	|	z; 	w = w,, θ") =
B(I,K;	GMG3,F))
B(I,K;	F)
× D(y|z; θ+), 
 
where D(y|z; θ+) = ∫D(y|	z, w; θ) 𝑑𝑤, D(y, z; 	θ) = ∫D(y, z, w; θ) 𝑑𝑤, and θ+ is a 
function of θ. Note that here we use D(y, z;	w = w,, θ!), where θ! is a function of 
θ, rather than D(y, z;	w = w,, θ), because we want to emphasize that, when moving 
from D(y, z, w; θ) to D(y, z;	w = w,, θ!),  the	parameter	vector	θ may change. θ! 
can be seen as a function of θ and w. However, there is nothing wrong with using the 
general notation D(y, z;	w = w,, θ)	 instead. External inference in this setting entails 
assessing D(y|z; θ+) based on the estimation of D(y	|	z; 	w = w,, θ") (i.e., from a 
subpopulation to the overarching population). Note also that θ! and θ+ are not 
variation-free (Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983), so θ+, estimated by optimizing a 
loss function based on D(y	|	z; 	w = w,, θ"), generally does not coincide with the 
result obtained by estimating on the basis of an optimization of a loss function based 
on D(y|z; θ+),	which researchers cannot optimize in any event, since the available 
data is generated only from the subpopulation with w = w,. Taking these 
considerations into account, we define:  
 
(1) Overarching External Validity as B(I,K;	GMG3,F))
B(I,K;	F)
= 1.  
(2) Indirect Overarching External Validly when the function g(θ) = B(I,K;	GMG3,F))
B(I,K;	F)
 is 
either known or estimable and can be used to adjust a loss function based on 
D(y	|	z; 	w = w,, θ") that makes it possible to estimate D(y|z; θ+). Clearly, this 
requires a known (or assumed) relationship between the subpopulation under 
study, D(y, z;	w = w,, θ!), and the overarching population, D(y, z; 	θ), which is 






From the above discussion, it is clear that it is more likely that an internally valid 
estimate will have punctual or local external validity than external validity or 
overarching external validity. Thus, not surprisingly, the existing literature has 
focused on specific populations for extrapolation, making specific assumptions about 
the relationship between the population for which there are internally valid estimates 
and the target population. Next, we review that literature.  
 
2.3. Literature Review 
One reason why internally valid estimates of causal constructs might lack external 
validity is because of changes in the population over time. We could posit, for 
example, that w in the above framework varies over time. In such a setup, 
Rosenzweig and Udry (2018) provide an innovative way of conducting external 
inference. Using repeated cross-sections, they estimate the causal effect of interest 
over time, where in each period the vector w is fixed at some specific value. They 
focus on one dimension of w for which they have a measurement, i.e., rainfall. They 
then estimate the response of the casual construct of interest to rainfall. Using the 
empirical distribution of the underlying shock (rainfall), they can infer both how the 
causal parameter of interest varies with this shock and its average effect. Thus, they 
also estimate the effect for the overarching population. This method requires that 
other time-varying unobservable variables in w are not correlated with the observable 
one, which, in their application, may be the case, since rainfall is determined outside 
the economic system, although it still might trigger adjustments in some unobservable 
variables. 
 
Andrews and Oster (2019) propose a method for estimating the average treatment 
effect (ATE) for a target population based on another population (often a trial 
population) for which a researcher is assumed to have an internally valid estimate. 
They assume that the conditional ATE-given covariates and unobservables are the 
same in the trial and target populations (and that the covariates and unobservables are 
uncorrelated). First, they adjust the ATE by differences in covariates between the trial 





simultaneously affect individual treatment effects and the likelihood that individuals 
in the target population were also in the trial population. Relying on this model, they 
derive a formula to adjust the ATE for differences in unobservables.  
 
Other papers have dealt with the issue of non-compliance in instrumental variables 
estimation. One line of discussion about external validity relates to the local average 
treatment effect (LATE) (see Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996). The standard setup 
assumes the presence of a binary endogenous treatment variable instrumented with a 
binary ignorable variable (for example, random assignment to treatment). Assuming 
monotonicity, the population is divided into three groups: (1) compliers, whose 
treatment status is affected by the instrument; (2) always-takers, who always receive 
treatment regardless of the value of the instrumental variable; and (3) never-takers, 
who never receive treatment regardless of the value of the instrumental variable. The 
second and third groups are usually combined and labeled as non-compliers. The 
variation (information) in the instrument only makes a difference for compliers. 
Since, in this setting, internally valid estimates are derived from the variation in the 
instrument, the estimates do not provide a basis for internally valid inferences about 
the whole population, but only about a hypothetical population of compliers. The 
question with regard to external validity that usually arises in this setting has to do 
with when and how estimates for compliers can be used to infer the parameter of 
interest for the whole population. Naturally, the first step in answering this question is 
to understand the relationship between compliers and non-compliers. Examples in the 
literature include Angrist (2004) and Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010). Angrist 
(2004) examines a few possible relationships between compliers and non-compliers 
that yield externally valid inferences and then estimates the ATE using information 
for the LATE under each relationship. Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010) assume that 
the instrumental variables, conditional on covariates, are as good as if they were 
randomly assigned and that observable covariates fully determine covariate-specific 
treatment effects. The relationship between compliers and non-compliers is then 
reduced to different compositions of observable covariate values. Since the LATE 





the EV problem of differentiating the ATE from the LATE becomes one of 
modifying the weights used in the LATE to align them with the weights used in the 
ATE. 
 
Another line of analysis concerning external validity involves regression 
discontinuity methods. A regression discontinuity estimator is, by definition, a local 
estimator: it only identifies causal constructs for the subpopulation of subjects whose 
forcing variable values are near a discontinuity threshold (and are also compliers in 
the case of a fuzzy design). The external validity question usually asked in such a 
setting is how estimates for the subjects near the threshold (and that are also 
compliers) apply to the sample population. Naturally, the first step in assessing 
external validity in this setting is to understand the difference between the subjects 
whose treatment effect can be identified and other subjects. Dong and Lewbel (2015) 
exploit the sensitivity of estimates of the forcing variable to shed light on the 
relationship between subjects with different forcing variable values. Angrist and 
Rokkanen (2015) advocate testing whether the forcing variable and the “treatment” 
outcome are uncorrelated conditional on variables, which, if it were the case, would 
be informative about the relationship between subjects with different forcing variable 
values and, in turn, could be of use in addressing external validity questions. Bertanha 
and Imbens (2018) focus on the fuzzy regression discontinuity design and provide a 
test to determine whether compliers are systematically different from non-compliers 
conditional on the forcing variable as well as exogenous covariates. They argue that 
external validity requires the null hypothesis of no differences in order to be valid.  
 
These studies share a common feature: the pivotal element in approaching the issue of 
external validity is assumptions about the relationship between the population for 
which there are internally valid estimates of causal parameters and the population for 
which the researcher would like to make an external inference. The relationships 
exploited in the above-cited studies are the one between compliers and non-
compliers, the one between subjects with different forcing variable values, and the 





external validity is determined by these relationships, as we explain in Sections 2.1 
and 2.2.  
 
These papers focus on specific populations as a basis for extrapolations and do not 
explore EV in any general form. This is natural enough, since, for any given 
population, the relationship between it and the population that was originally studied 
can be easily assumed or modeled, while it is very hard to undertake an evaluation of 
EV in general. Thus, in terms of our analysis, the literature has focused mostly on 
methods relating to the concept of local external validity.  
 
In the next section, we propose a method for assessing EV both for specific 
populations and generally. Our method is based on the insights derived from Sections 
2.1 and 2.2. The focus is on determining the likelihood that an internally valid 
estimate could be generalized not only to the overarching population (overarching 
external validity) but also to specific populations, starting from those close (local 
external validity) to the one studied and then moving away from it to more different 
populations (external validity).  
 
 
3. Assessing external validity 
We propose a method for evaluating the degree to which a conclusion based on a 
given population applies to populations represented by samples that have been 
formed by randomly reweighting the original sample. Our method is therefore both 
data-driven and generally applicable.   
   
In order to maintain consistency with the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2, 
we assume that each reweighting corresponds to a value of w. After defining and 
constructing new populations, we propose a way of measuring the extent to which the 
conclusion reached about the original sample holds true for the reweighted samples 
(or the new populations). This is a global measure of EV (based on the concept of 





concepts of local external validity and external validity) by grouping new populations 
based on a specific criterion and then measuring the degree to which the conclusion 
for the original sample still holds for each group. 
 
3.1 Defining new populations and constructing representative samples 
We assume that a researcher starts from a randomized controlled trial (RCT) dealing 
with a given population and then wants to assess the degree of EV of the causal 
constructs that have been estimated. We provide a general method for doing this. Our 
method, inspired by our formal and general reflection above, takes advantage of 
RCTs as shown below. However, it should be noted that the problem of external 
validity is general and not restricted to RCTs. 
 
Assume that the sample size of the control group is m and the sample size of the 
treatment group is l, so the sample size analyzed is n=l+m. Assume also that there is 
baseline pre-treatment information (Y, X)’, which is usually the case. We pair each 
observation in the treatment group with its nearest observation in the control group in 
terms of the Mahalanobis distance20 using the baseline information (the Mahalanobis 
distance between vectors of baseline information (Y, X)’). We thus choose the nearest 
neighbor in the control group to each observation in the treatment group as a 
counterfactual and pair the two observations. Repetitive use of observations from the 
control group are allowed, and unused observations from the control group are 
discarded after all observations from the treatment group are paired. For each pair, we 
assign an index i∈{1,2,…l}.  
 
 
20 The Mahalanobis distance can be defined as the Euclidean distance with each variable rescaled to have unit 
variance. Though this distance is the most commonly used measure in the literature, there are many alternative 
matching criteria (Rosenbaum, 2010) that researchers can use for their specific purposes. In addition, researcher 










with p5 ≥ 0 and ∑ p5O" = 1. (G", G!, … , GO). is a random vector, with each element 
drawn independently from the Gama(1,1) distribution. Reweighting the original 
sample based on the Gama(1,1) generates reweighting vectors uniformly distributed 
over all possible reweighting vectors (Efron and Hastie, 2016), so our exploration of 
how the original conclusions apply to new populations treats every possible 
population evenly. For each reweighting P = (p", p!, … , pO). =
(P#,P),…,P4)5
∑ P/4#
 of the 
original sample, we create a reweighted sample in which p5 is the weight for the pair 
indexed by i=1, 2, … , l. We do multiple reweighting (as many as 1,000 times), and 
we regard each reweighting outcome as a sample representing a new population. 








is a consistent estimator of the original 
population. Therefore, each weighting vector corresponds to a consistent estimate of a 
new population. The new populations arrived at by reweighting the original sample 
are deemed to be conceptually valid in the light of the following citation: 
 
“[…] the only populations that can be referred to in a test of significance have no 
objective reality, being exclusively the product of the statistician’s imagination 
[…].”(Fisher, 1956) 
 
3.2 A global measure of EV 
We now propose a global measure of EV for the average treatment effect (ATE), but 
our measure can be applied to any estimand obtained by contrasting treatment and 
control groups in an RCT. For each reweighted sample, we calculate the ATE and its 
standard error. Our proposed global measure of EV for the original internally valid 
analysis is based on the percentage of new populations for which the original 
conclusion still holds true. We say that the original conclusion holds when one of the 
following holds: if, in the original sample, the estimate was not statistically 
significant at a certain level, then the same is true for the reweighted sample or, if the 





the reweighted sample it is also significant, at least at that level, and with the same 
coefficient sign as in the original population.      
 
We start from an RCT and estimate the new populations by means of a matching 
estimator with replacement. Abadie and Imbens (2006) set out conditions for the 
consistency of this matching estimator.21 However, in finite samples, there are two 
sources of bias due to imperfect matching on observables and non-matching on 
unobservables. For the second source of bias, researchers can perform a sensitivity 
analysis as introduced by Rosenbaum (2010) and Imbens and Rubin (2015).  
 
Correcting the first source of bias can be done using the methods discussed in Imbens 
and Rubin (2015, sect. 18.8). We use one of those methods to adjust the estimates for 
new populations and therefore, from now on, when we refer to the estimated ATE for 
new populations, we are referring to bias-adjusted estimates, as follows:  
 
1. With the data from the original control group, we have regressed the outcomes 
on observable variables and recorded coefficients for baseline variables as B. 
2. We have adjusted each pair’s treatment-minus-control outcome by – 
(observable variables of the treated in the pair)*B + (observable variable of 
the control in the pair)*B.  
 
Up until now, we had assumed that all the subjects were compliers in the original 
sample or we had focused on the intention-to-treat effect (ITT). However, there is no 
problem with including non-compliers in the analysis and focusing on a parameter 
such as the LATE since the reweighted samples are expected to be balanced for non-
compliers, especially when the sample size is large.  
 
 
21 The data and treatment assignment from an RCT satisfy the conditions required for consistency given in Abadie 
and Imbens (2006). The matching estimator here is a weighted sum, but given our way of generating reweighting 
vectors, when the sample size goes to infinity, the probability that a finite number of pairs receive all the weight 






Alternatively, one possibility is to estimate the average effect on compliers. Under 
standard assumptions, we know who the never-takers in the treatment group are. In 
their case, we can improve on the matching with the control group because we can 
add the residuals of the treatment effect analysis (in addition to the baseline variables 
already used) to the matching variables. Thus, we can also match on unobservables. 
This matching strategy does not work for compliers, since their residuals are affected 
by their heterogeneous treatment effects. Always-takers can be matched in the same 
fashion. After matching, researchers can restrict their analysis to compliers both in the 
original sample and in the EV exercises proposed in this paper.  
 
3.3 Local measures of EV 
With a large number (e.g., 1,000) of reweighted samples, each representing a new 
population, these populations can be grouped based on a given criterion. We now 
have a vector of treatment-control matched pairs from the original sample. Each pair 
yields a treatment-minus-control outcome, adjusted as proposed in the previous 
section based on Imbens and Rubin (2015). First, we calculate the correlation 
between the vector of these adjusted treatment-minus-control outcomes and each 
reweighting vector. The higher this correlation is, the more weight a reweighting 
vector gives to pairs with high treatment-minus-control outcomes. Second, we 
calculate 1 minus this correlation for each reweighting vector (i.e., for each new 
population); this calculation gives the distance of a new population from the 
population with the largest effect magnitude. Note that the original population has a 
distance of 1 because the above correlation for the original population is zero, so the 
extent of the difference between other populations and the original population can be 
summarized by how their distance measure differs from 1.  
 
Intuitively, populations with a distance measure close to 1 give similar weights to 
pairs with high or low adjusted treatment-minus-control outcomes, so they are “near” 
the original population, which gives equal weight to every pair. Populations with a 





(positively) correlated with the vector of the adjusted treatment-minus-control 
outcomes, so they give more weight to pairs with small (large) effect magnitudes.  
 
With the above definition of distance, we then also propose using the EV curve to 
measure the degree to which the conclusion regarding the original population holds 
for new populations as their distance from the population with the largest effect 
magnitude (moving away from distance zero) or from the original population 
increases (moving away from distance 1). The EV curve is defined below, with 
distance denoted by d. 
 
EV(d) =
Number	of	new	populations	for	which	the	original	result	holds	at	distance ∈ [d, d + ϵ]
Number	of	new	populations	at	distance ∈ [d, d + ϵ]  
 
In the definition of the EV curve, the original result holds when, as above, one of the 
following holds: if, in the original sample the estimate was not statistically significant 
at a certain level, then the same is true for the reweighted sample or, if the estimate 
was originally significant at a certain level, then it is also significant, at least at that 
level, and with the same coefficient sign as the new population.   
 
Before we provide examples illustrating the two methods proposed above, we need to 
add a caveat that applies to both of them. If the sample at hand or the population 
represented by the sample being studied does not contain characteristics that would 
generate a new population and are relevant for the statistical inference, then our 
method is moot. One cannot make bricks without straw. Any statistical method can be 
useful only up to the point that its information inputs allow. Our method is designed 
to provide the best possible assessment of EV based on a single sample (a single 
population), which is usually all that researchers have. 
 
3.4. Two Simulated Examples 
We now provide two simulated examples to illustrate our method for assessing EV. 
First, we start from an internally valid analysis assumed to have a significantly 





to be used to assess EV locally. Second, we do the same exercise starting from an 
internally valid analysis that is assumed to have an ATE that is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
3.4.1 Assessing EV for an internally valid significant positive result 
In the first simulated example, the sample size is 100, with 50 observations in the 
treatment group and 50 in the control group. There are two observable variables, x1 
and x2, and one unobservable variable, u. For each of these three variables, 100 
values are drawn independently from the standard normal distribution. The (potential) 
heterogeneous treatment effect for each observation, whether it is in the treatment 
group or control group, is given by τ5 = x"5 + x!5 + u5 + v5 + 10 ∗ 1{c5 > 0.8}, 
where v5 is drawn from a unit-variance normal distribution with a mean=-1, and c5 is 
drawn from the 0-1 uniform distribution. 
 
We define the treatment status vector, a vector with a length of 100, as D, of which 
the first 50 elements are equal to 1 and the other 50 elements are equal to 0. D5=1 
indicates that observation i is in the treatment group; D5=0 indicates that observation i 
is in the control group. The outcome variable is thus defined as: y5 = 1 + τ5 ∗ D5 +
x"5 + x!5 + u5. The internally valid estimate of ATE in our simulation is 1.52 with a 
standard error equal to 0.677 and a p-value for a test of the null hypothesis (ATE 
equals 0) equal to 0.027. 
 
We generate 1,000 reweighting vectors over the pair indices as explained in Section 
3.1 and calculate the global measure of EV introduced in Section 3.2. In this case, this 
measure is the proportion of these 1,000 new populations for which the lower bound 
of the confidence interval is greater than zero. Since the original analysis is 
significant at the 95% level, we choose the lower bound associated with two standard 
errors. The value of the global measure of EV in our simulated example is 0.584. This 
means that the conclusion reached in the original internally valid analysis holds for 






Now we compute the EV curve, EV(d), introduced in Section 3.3. To apply the 
definition of EV(d)22, we note that when the original result holds for a new 
population, this means that the confidence interval lower bound for the new 
population is greater than zero. Since the original analysis is significant at the 95% 
level, we choose the lower bound for new populations as point estimates - two 
standard errors. If we look at the curve starting from a distance equal to 1, we see the 
positions of the new populations relative to the original population, whose distance 
measure equals 1. (Remember that the distance is a measurement of the distance of a 
new population from the population with the largest possible effect magnitude.) In 
Figure 1 below, we see that the original conclusion of positive significance is very 
likely to hold at a small distance (around 1 and smaller than 1) and it is very unlikely 
to hold at a large distance. Intuitively, new populations with small distances have 
more weights on pairs with large effect magnitudes and those with large distances 
have more weights on pairs with small or even negative effect magnitudes. In this 
example, EV is assessed locally by seeing how quickly EV(d) drops as the distance 
moves to the right and away from distance 1 (the distance for the original population), 
 
22 With respect to the choice of ϵ in the definition of EV(d), we choose a value of 0.05 in both this and the next 
example in order to make the curve smooth. This works like a moving average that smooths out a graph. Note 
that if ϵ is too small, the curve will be very rugged locally; if it is too large, the curve will not be locally 





around which EV(d) is about 80%. 
 
 
3.4.2 Assessing EV for an internally valid result without a significant difference 
from zero 
In the second simulated example, the setup is the same as in the first example except 
that the (potential) heterogeneous treatment effect is instead given by τ5 = x"5 + x!5 +
u5 +w5 + 10 ∗ 1{c5 > 0.8}, where w5, instead of v5 as in the previous example, is 
drawn from a unit-variance normal distribution with a mean=-2. x"5, x!5, u5, c5, D5, 
and y5 are generated in the same way as in the previous example. The internally valid 
estimate of ATE in our simulation is then 0.52 with a standard error equal to 0.677 
and a p-value for a test of the null hypothesis (ATE equals 0) that equals 0.446. 
 
We generate 1,000 reweighting vectors over the pair indices as explained in Section 
3.1 and calculate the global measure of EV introduced in Section 3.2. In this case, this 
measure is the proportion of the new populations with confidence intervals including 
zero in these 1,000 new populations. Since the original analysis yields an estimate not 
significantly different from 0 at the 95% significance level, we choose the lower 





global measure of EV in our simulated example is 0.908. This means that the 
conclusion reached in the original internally valid analysis holds for 90.8% of the 
uniformly generated new populations from reweighting the original sample. 
 
Now we compute the EV curve, EV(d), introduced in Section 3.3. Applying the 
definition of EV(d), we note that when the original result holds for a new population, 
this means that the new population’s confidence interval includes zero. Since the 
original analysis yields an estimate not significantly different from 0 at the 95% 
significance level, we choose the range of confidence intervals for new populations as 
point estimates ± two standard errors. In Figure 2 below, as expected, we see that the 
original conclusion of no significance (neither significantly positive nor significantly 
negative) is very unlikely to hold at very large or very small distances. We also see 
that, as new populations move closer to the original population, whose distance 
measure is equal to 1, EV(d) increases. In Figure 2, we see that EV(d) is 100% in the 
small neighborhood of the original population and that EV(d) eventually drops as the 








4. Final Remarks 
Our method of evaluating EV is based on our theoretical definitions of external 
validity. It has become clear that, in order to achieve external validity in a practical 
sense, we need to identify new populations whose relationship with the population 
represented by the original sample is reasonable and workable. In particular, we 
assume that each specific w which defined new populations in Section 2 corresponds 
to a new weighting. 
 
Our method of evaluating external validity is purely data-driven, but theory can play 
an important role in valid extrapolation (Getchter et al., 2018; Deaton, 2010; Wolpin, 
2013). As discussed above, our method goes only as far as the information contained 
in the sample (original population) allows it to go. When a researcher wants to say 
something about a new population with inference-relevant characteristics that are 
absent from the original population, he or she needs to make further assumptions and 
to model certain mechanisms. One fruitful line of future work could be to use a 
combination of theoretical and experimental approaches to measure the 
generalizability of those mechanisms. 
 
Once researchers have conducted an internally valid analysis, that analysis yields an 
established set of findings for the specific case in question. As for the future 
usefulness of that result, however, what matters is its degree of EV. To design for EV, 
what is wanted is a sample that includes as many different subjects as possible, ones 
that do not necessarily represent the original population. Specifically, if, for the 
population studied in an internally valid analysis, very small weights or no weight at 
all are assigned to some kinds of subjects, then the sample at hand may include very 
few such subjects or even none at all; if this is the case, such subjects will have very 
little chance of being represented in new populations. This limitation of the original 
sample limits the assessment of EV. Thus, stratification at sampling may enhance EV 
analysis. Similarly, the use of non-representative samples may also facilitate EV 





Chapter 3: Development Spillover and Institutional Changes: A 






The importance of good institutions for economic development has been well argued 
and documented (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2005a; North, 1990). Better protected property rights lead to more 
expected payoffs from economic activities (Besley and Ghatak, 2010); with increased 
expected payoffs, people tend to invest and trade more, and consequently more gains 
of trade promote economic development (Yang, 2003). That trade and specialization 
stimulate growth has been emphasized since Adam Smith, and it has been well argued 
that more can be produced with the technology of increasing returns to scale, if 
people specialize and trade instead of producing everything by themselves. Such 
gains of trade can affect and be affected by institutions: improved institutions can 
increase expected payoffs for people who trade and induce more people to trade as 
pointed out above, while potential gains of trade could serve as stimuli for people to 
push for better institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005b).  
Some empirical observations suggest potential relationships between trade and 
institutions. Kelejian, Murrell and Shepotylo (2014) show spatial spillover in 
institutional development between neighboring countries that also tend to trade more 
with each other (Limao and Venables, 2001). Other empirical evidence shows 
specific interactions between institutions and trade in historical contexts. Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005b) show the positive impact of Atlantic trade on 
institutional changes in early modern Europe; Keller and Shiue (2016) show how 
French rule in 19th century Germany expanded trade. Theories have been provided to 
explain interactions between institutions and trade, and each emphasizes different 





economy of trade policies (Galiani and Torrens, 2014). This paper differs from the 
existing literature with a political economy perspective of trade costs and provides a 
theoretical framework formalizing mutual promotion between trade and institutional 
changes, as well as how such interdependency matters for economic development. It 
should be noted that it’s possible for a multitude of mechanisms to coexist or different 
mechanisms to be conjured up under different conditions. 
In particular, I build a theoretical model that comprises an economic equilibrium 
capturing how institutional quality affects trade and a concatenated political 
equilibrium capturing how trade affects institutional changes, as well as the 
implication of the interdependency on economic development. The model features an 
integration of economic and political equilibria, which is inspired by Galiani, 
Schofield, and Torrens (2014). What directly follows is an intuitive summary of my 
model. First, gains from specialization encourage trade, while trade costs arising from 
poor institutional quality discourage trade. I define trade costs as a combination of 
transportation costs and elite expropriation on trade. Thus, more people participate in 
trade under lower trade costs or better institutions. Furthermore, the better the 
institutional quality of a trade partner, the more prosperous an economy is in terms of 
both trade and per capita utility/income, because more people in the partner country 
will trade and demand the economy’s goods. Additionally, more people dedicated to 
trade imply a larger commercial class in an economy, and a larger commercial class 
has a higher bargaining power against the local extractive elite whose expropriation 
partially explains trade costs. The extractive elite trades off between potential social 
conflicts and avoiding conflicts by decreasing expropriation (reform) when 
challenged by the commercial class, while the commercial class trades off between 
fighting for a better institution (lower expropriation) with a losing probability and 
leaving the reality as it is. These tradeoffs and common knowledge of the elite’s 
anticipation of the commercial class’s response generate strategic interaction, which 
is to be modeled in a political game. Finally, the interaction leads to institutional 
changes if initial institutional quality is high enough but not very high: when initial 
institutional quality is very low (high), the commercial class has no capability 





arguments and to be specific with the economic and political implications and their 
required conditions. 
In Section 3 I provide major comparative statics of the model and in Section 4 I 
provide historical evidence consistent with my results. The historical cases 
correspond to early modern Europe and 19th century Germany, where I find stories of 
trade, institutions and economic development that are consistent with my model. 
Briefly speaking, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005b) tell an empirical story 
about institutional changes induced by Atlantic trade in early modern Europe, which 
inspires and supports this work, namely, Keller and Shiue (2016) tell an empirical 
story about expanded trade induced by a trade partners’ institutional changes (French 
rule) in 19th century Germany, which supports this work from another perspective. In 
Section 5 I conclude with a few comments on how this work is relevant to current 
issues as well as on methodology. 
 
 
2. A Theoretical Framework of Political Trading Economy 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue 
that Atlantic trade stimulated commercial class development for post-medieval 
European countries with relative better initial institutional quality (mainly in terms of 
more constraints on rulers’ expropriation). These developments lead to institutional 
improvement that finally put the countries onto the track of modern economic growth. 
The theoretical framework below is inspired but not limited by this argument. In 
particular, I explore economic agents’ tradeoffs between self-provision (without trade 
costs but with a fixed learning cost) and trade (without the fixed cost but with trade 
costs). I construct a model to formalize the idea that trade contributes to an economic 
unit’s prosperity thanks to specialization, and such contribution is greater when 
institutional quality of the economic unit or its trade partner is better. Moreover, this 
model also clarifies a mechanism about how increased commercial community size 






Next, we discuss the theoretical framework that comprises an economic 
equilibrium connecting trade, economic development, and institutions; and a political 
equilibrium connecting commercial community size, initial institutional quality and 
institutional changes. 
 
2.1 The Economic Equilibrium 
Inspired by Yang (2003, Chapters 4 and 7), I start with the decision problem of a 
consumer-producer who chooses whether to produce by herself all her consumption 
or trade for some consumption with her productions as a price taker. I do not adopt 
the commonly used neoclassical dichotomy of consumers and firms. By focusing on 
the consumption, production, and trade decisions all made by one economic agent, 
the model sheds insightful lights on tradeoffs that endogenize labor division and 
development of the commercial class. Consequently, the model can provide a 
perspective on why and how institutions matter. These will be made clear as I go on. 
I assume there are two economic units (economy i and i.) and two goods (good j 
and j.) for consumption.Each economy has a unit mass of people (consumer-
producers). I assume the two economies differ in two aspects. First, people in 
economy i (i.) have advantages in the production and commercialization of good j 
(j.)in the sense thatpeople in economy i (i.) have to pay a fixed learning cost to 
produce and cannot commercialize good j.(j), while they need not pay a fixed cost to 
produce and can commercialize j (j.).23 I denote the person-specific learning cost with 
A and assume it is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 in each economy. Second, if 
a consumer-producer in economy i chooses to trade, she has to pay a trade cost in the 
sense that she loses a fraction, 1 − K5, of the goods she trades in.  
 
23 In a more general setup, people within the same economy could also trade with each other. I assume away this 
possibility mainly because it complicates mathematics a lot without changing model insights. As long as people 
from different economies trade with each other under the trade cost and the production (dis)advantage setup, 
the mechanism modeled and the model insights survive. If we allow for the possibility that people within the 
same economy could also trade with each other, only added is a new feature that inter-economy trade would 
disappear (or there would be an autarky) if trade costs are high enough. Since this is not the purpose of this 
model and complicates mathematics too much, I assume away the possibility. Besides, it could be assumed that 
when some people in economy i have learned to produce good j+, what they produce are simply home 
production and consumption satisfying the same desire as the bought exotic good j+ does, but could not be sold 
in the market. For a toy example, I can cook by myself or eat in a restaurant and have the same desire satisfied, 





K5	(for people in economy i) is crucial for this model. I define K5 = (1 − t5)k5. t5 
denotes physical trade costs, such as transportation costs, and1 − t5 is the proportion 
left after physical trade costs are paid. I assume in each economy that there is an 
extractive elite who does not assume any productive role and expropriates a 
fraction,	1 − k5, of traded-in goods after physical trade costs are paid. So, 
the	(1 − t5)k5	is a proportion of traded-in goods finally consumed by an economy i’s 
consumer-producer who trades.	k5	serves as a measure of institutional quality of 
economy i and is higher with less expropriation. 
 
The decision problem of a consumer-producer 
I start from the decision problem of an economy i’s consumer-producer with her 
learning cost to produce good j. being A, which is person-specific and follows the 
same distribution in each economy. Economyi’s consumer-producers do not need to 
pay learning costs to produce good j, as they are assumed to have advantage in it. 
Next, I focus on economy i (things are defined and derived analogically for 
economy	i.). 
 
Utility to be maximized by a consumer-producer:	𝐮𝐢𝐀 = 𝐱𝐣𝐱65 
Subscript iA means this consumer-producer is from economy i and her learning cost 
to produce good j. is A. 𝐱𝐣	and 𝐱65 	respectively denote the amount of goods j and j. 
consumed by the consumer-producer. 
 
Subject to Constraints (in addition to non-negativity of all variables): 
(1) 𝐱𝐣 = 𝐊𝐢𝐱𝐣𝐝 + 𝐱𝐣
𝐩 − 𝐱𝐣𝐬; 	𝐱𝐣5 = 𝐊𝐢𝐱𝐣5
𝐝 + 𝐱𝐣5
𝐩 ; 
x6W denotes the amount of good j demanded by the consumer-producer from trade, and 
the superscript “d” stands for “demand from trade.” As discussed above, only a 
fraction of traded-in amount, K5x6W, are consumed by the consumer-producer because 
of trade costs. x6
0 denotes the amount of good j produced by the consumer-producer, 
and the superscript p stands for “production.” x6X denotes the amount of good 1 





for trade,” so the amount of good j that the consumer-producer consumes is equal to 
the amount she buys discounted by trade costs plus her production minus the amount 
she sells. Things are similarly defined for good	j. except that there is no x65
X , since 
people in economy i are assumed un able to commercialize their productions of	j.. 
 
(2) 𝐱𝐣
𝐩 = 𝐋𝐣; 𝐱65
𝐩 = 𝐋65 − 𝐀 
This describes the consumer-producer’s production of goods j and j.. L6(𝐋65) denotes 
the amount of labor used by the consumer-producer to produce good j (j.), since the 
consumer-producer in economy i has advantage in producing good j, x6
0 = L6: one 
unit of labor for one unit of output. The consumer-producer has to pay a learning cost 
to produce good j., so x6
0 = L6 − A. A is the fixed learning cost that this consumer-
producer in economy i has to pay to if she chooses produce good j., which she is not 
good at, and is assumed to be uniformly distributed across [0, 1]. 
 
(3) 𝐋𝐣 + 𝐋𝐣5 = 𝟏(each consumer-producer is endowed with 1 unit of labor) 
 
(4) 𝐩𝐣𝐱𝐣𝐬 = 𝐩𝐣5𝐱𝐣5
𝐝 + 𝐩𝐣𝐱𝐣𝐝 
This is sale=expenditure. p6, p65  are prices of goods j and j. that are exogenous to 
individuals but endogenous in general equilibrium. Since I assume costs to 
commercialize good j.in economy i are prohibitively high, any good j.  produced in 
economy i are not for sale but for self-consumption. 
 
The above optimization problem involves comparing corner solutions, i.e., comparing 
maximized utilities achieved respectively under self-provision and trade. An analogy 
mentioned in Yang (2003) makes this methodology clear: if we are studying college 
education decision, we frame the problem such that a person first decides whether to 
take physics or economics as her major and then decides how to allocate time among 
subfields of the chosen major. Two corner solutions of interest for the above 





(S)Self-provision: 𝐱𝐣𝐬 = 𝐱𝐣𝐝 = 𝐱𝐣5
𝐝 = 𝟎 
(T)Trade: not producing but buying goodj.:𝐱𝐣𝐬 > 0, 𝐱𝐣5
𝐝 > 0, 𝐱𝐣𝐝 = 𝟎, 𝐱𝐣5
𝐩 = 𝟎 
There are other possible corners, such as people both selling and buying good j in 
economy i. But, all the possibilities other than (S) and (T) can be safely ignored, 
given the model assumption and Wen’s Theorem in Wen (1998). For model 
structures including the one adopted here, Wen (1998) proves an individual does not 
simultaneously buy and sell the same good, nor does she simultaneously buy and self-
provide the same good; she sells at most one good. 
One point should be clear now: if an economy i’s consumer-producer chooses to 
trade, she sells good j and trades with people from economy i.selling goodj.. 
Although labor division does not necessarily mean inter-economic-unit trade, such as 
international trade, I only focus on inter-economic-unit trade without modeling intra-
unit trade that only complicates the model without providing more insights for the 
current purpose.  
 
A consumer-producer’s optimized decisions given prices and a learning cost 
Under (S) Self-provision with x6X = x6W = x65
W = 0 and constraint (4) irrelevant, 
optimization leads tox6 = x65 =
"&Y
!
 for the consumer-producer with person-specific 




(T) Trade with people in economy i selling good j and buying good j. from 
economy	i. and x6X > 0, x65
W > 0, x6W = 0, x65







 for given prices p6 and p65. Thus, the maximized utility under (T) is 
Z/00
'005
. We then 
have below results for economy i. 
Comparing maximized utilities under (S) and (T), a consumer-producer in 









otherwise, the consumer-producer chooses self-provision. It follows that the 
number/measure of people in economy i choosing to trade is £
Z/00
005





assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. This is the commercial class size in 
economy i for given prices and trade costs. 
Above is the solution for economy i, and the solution for economy i. is derived 
in the same way with subscripts i and i. swapped, j and j. swapped. 
 
Equilibrium price given institutional quality 𝐤𝐢, 	𝐤𝐣 




each of them has a supply of good j x6X =
"
!




people in economy i sell good j and only they buy good j.. So the aggregate supply of 





 (individual supply in economy i times the number of 






 (individual demand in economy i. times the number of individual in 
economyi. who demand). Aggregated demand and supply for good j. are derived 
analogically. I use capital letter X for aggregate demand (the superscript D stands for 
Demand) and supply (the superscript S stands for supply), while lowercase x stands 
for individual demand and supply. With market clearing conditions that equalize 










 Economic equilibrium outcomes 
Plugging the solved relative price to individual decisions and the commercial class 
size expression, I get below economic results or comparative statics. Recall 𝐊𝐢 =
(𝟏 − 𝐭𝐢)𝐤𝐢, where k5 measures institutional quality. 
 
Economic Result 1: The commercial class size (the measure of people who trade) 









institutional quality k5 but also on its trade partner’s institutional quality	k55. 
Clearly, the size is a number between 0 and 1. 
 
Economic Result 2: The average utility (welfare per consumer-producer) in 









. The total welfare of existing merchants (the aggregated 








positively depend not only on economy i’s own institutional qualityk5 but also on 
its trade partner’s institutional quality	k55. 
 










(1 − k5), since the extractive elite expropriates a fraction,	1 − k5, of 
every unit traded-in after physical trade costs are paid. Endogenous determination 
of k5 will be modeled in a political game below. 
 
Intuitively, with higher k5(better institutional quality in terms of less 
expropriation), trade expands, increased specialization reduces total fixed learning 
costs paid, and total output consumed in each economy increases without increasing 
labor endowments. That is, TFP increases due to an institutional improvement.  
However, the above depicts an incomplete picture. According to North (1981) 
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a), institutions are endogenously 
determined and changed in the political interaction between parties that have different 
economic benefit-cost calculations. So, in the following, I endogenize	k5 with a 
political gamebased on above economic outcomes that stipulate each party’s benefit-
cost calculation. 
 
2.2 The Political Equilibrium 
In this part, I focus on economy i and construct a political game between the 





i) is endogenized given exogenously K55, t5 and other parameters discussed below. I 
provide comparative statics of changing t5 and K55in Section 3, and relate them to 
historical evidence in Section 4. Here, the political game is intended to provide 
insights on how trade interacting with an economy’s initial institutional quality (this 
is a path dependence story) can have implications for institutional changes. The 
resulting political equilibrium combined with the above economic equilibrium that 
depicts how institutional quality affects trade complete my logic of mutual promotion 
of institutional improvements and trade expansion. 
 
Setup conditions and assumptions for the political game 
First and most crucially, there is an initial constraint on the extractive elite of 
economy i. The constraint is denoted askC̀ . I assume the elite is free to choose 
k5	above	kC̀ , but not able to choose k5 below kC̀ . I also assume if the elite wants to 
change the institutional constraint on him to k§̀ , he can only choose k§̀ ≥ kC̀ . kC̀ 	is an 
exogenous and crucial parameter for the political game, where the interaction of kC̀  
and trade drives institutional changes. I have a few reasons behind this setup. (1) 
Economic and political phenomena never happen from nowhere, and, in many cases, 
a political economy has its context that has been determined historically, socially, or 
culturally; I parameterize such a context with kC̀  and interpret it as a constraint on the 
elite’s expropriation. (2) This interpretation leads to an asymmetry assumption that 
the elite is free to choose k5	above	kC̀ , but not able to choose k5 below kC̀ . This 
assumption is a little extreme, but softening it by assuming that it is less costly for the 
elite to choose k5abovekC̀  than below kC̀does not change intuitions and unnecessarily 
complicates mathematics. Please note the elite’s rent is concave in k5 and achieves its 
maximum at "
a




}. (3) This setup echoes the concept of institutional 
drifts in (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), which argues for the necessity of a good 
initial institutional quality for institutional improvements when there are 





from institutional drifts. However, kC̀  is not necessary to be interpreted as a result 
from drift. 
Second, I assume a threshold C between 0 and 1 such that if the size of the 
commercial class in economy i is below C, the probability for the commercial class to 
win a conflict against the elite is zero. Then, the commercial class would not fight for 
a better institution. If the size is above C, the commercial class has a winning 
probability P after choosing to fight against the elite for a better institution. Further, I 
assume the institutional quality k5becomes 1 and the elite gets zero rent if the 
commercial class wins the fight against the elite. If the commercial class loses, its 
members have zero consumption and nothing changes for the elite.24 
Third, the outcome depends on parameters and I restrict my discussion for the 
















It can be proved that H < 	P
(
-. I impose no restriction on kC̀ , so it could be any real 
number between 0 and 1. This third assumption leads to all possible cases for 
institutional stagnation and changes. At the end of Section 2, I briefly discuss other 
possible orderings that tend to shut down one or more cases. Besides, "
a
 is the best 
institutional choice for the elite without any meaningful constraint and I put "
a
 at a 
relatively extreme position because it is rare for an elite to be totally free to choose, 
even when the commercial class fails to form a threat. This third assumption also 
smoothes mathematics. 
In sum, K55, t5, kC̀ , C and P are the exogenous parameters underlying the political 
game for institutional changes in economy i. 
 
24 Alternatively, we can assume that when the commercial class loses, the ruler can reset k' regardless of the 
constraint	k,O , but this provides no extra insight for institutional changes, except for adding straightforwardly a 
possibility of institution deterioration. 
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The political game structure 
I construct a 2-stage game to formalize interactions between the commercial class and 
the extractive elite. I assume away mixed strategies. The payoffs are based on the 
economic results above. 
 
Stage 1: Starting from an initial institutional constraint	kC̀ , the extractive elite chooses 
whether to reform (i.e., to choose a k§̀ > kC̀  as a new constraint on his expropriation) 
or to do nothing (equivalently to choosek§̀ = kC̀ ). Choice of constraintk§̀  is a credible 
institutional change not a policy change. Note k§̀  is an endogenous choice and kC̀  is an 
exogenous parameter. 
 










} as discussed above,25 and this commercial class chooses 
whether to fight for a better institution or to leave the reality as it is. Whatever the 
result is, the commercial class after stage 2 is no longer able to initiate a fight.26  
 
Expected payoffs: The commercial class and the elite collect payoffs after stage 2. 









;(1 − k5)(1 − P) (the commercial class’s losing probability times the elite’s 
rent according Economic Result 3), where k5=max{k§̀ ,
"
a
},and the commercial class 
 
25 With the assumptions I make for the parameters, k' is always equal to k,V	in the below discussion. Other cases 
are possible with the assumptions relaxed, involve similar arguments, but lead to trivial outcomes and insights. 
26 There are a few ways to interpret this model setup. There could be a window of opportunity that ends after 
stage 2 for the commercial class to take collective actions. Alternatively P, the winning probability if the 
commercial class chooses to fight, can be seen as a subjective probability such that when the commercial class 














 (winning probability times the total utility of members in the 
commercial class when k5 becomes 1). Givenk§̀  and that the commercial class 




















Intuitions: The commercial class weighs fighting with a losing possibility against 
leaving the reality as it is. Although the elite likes k§̀  to be as low as kC̀ , he has to 
consider the negative impact of social conflicts on his expected payoff and may want 
to offer a higher k§̀  (reform) to avoid social conflicts. 
 
    In the model, the commercial class decides as a whole. This model actually ends up 
with the same conclusion if each merchant is assumed to make his own decision: the 
inequality governing the benefit-cost calculation of the whole commercial class is 
mathematically equivalent to the one for each individual, since in my setup people 
who trade are homogenous in their maximized utilities. To be more specific, the 


































 (an individual merchant’s expected payoff when the 









 (an individual merchant’s payoff when the 
commercial class does not fight). So, when it is better for the commercial class to 
fight, a member of the class also finds it better to fight if he believes other members 
find it better to fight. This belief can be supported by the above inequality governing 
individual decisions that are homogenous among the commercial class members.27 
 






The elite’s and commercial class’s equilibrium strategies 
In this part, I show equilibrium strategies of the elite and the commercial classes in 
the above game, leaving solution details in the next part. With these equilibrium 
strategies (mutually best responses), later, I can present political equilibrium results 
about how the initial institutional constraint (kC̀ ) matters for institutional changes 
throughinteracting with K55 (e.g.,i’s trade partner’s institutional changes) and t5 (e.g., 
transportation technology improvement or location advantages).  
 
The elite’s equilibrium choice (𝐤f§ ) in anticipation of the commercial class’s 
response and given the initial institutional constraint (𝐤fC ): 









𝟑 > 𝐤fC > 𝑯;  
any 𝐤f§ ∈ [𝐤fC ,
𝟏
𝟗
] if 𝐤fC >
𝟏
𝟗
 (or without loss of generally, 𝐤f§ =
𝟏
𝟗
 for this case). 











. It is easy to prove	H < 	P
(
-. I assume H>𝟏
𝟗
 to 
avoid trivial discussions.)  
 
Intuitively, when the initial institutional constraint is not very high or very low 
(	P
(
- > kC̀ > 𝐻), the elite would like to reform to avoid conflicts; the elite would 
otherwise make no changes, either because it is better for the elite to undergo 
conflicts or because the commercial class has no incentive or ability to struggle for a 
better institution. This will be seen more formally later in solution details. Figure 1 
visualizes how the elite’s institutional choice (choice of new institutional constraints) 
depends on initial institutional constraints when the elite takes into account the 
commercial class’s equilibrium strategy. Note the elite’s institutional choice is not 
 
thus a Nash equilibrium without collective actions is resulted in. However, I disregard this possibility because in 
the setup collectives actions should be more probable and interesting if each merchant knows other merchants’ 
payoffs, which I assume. Furthermore, as discussed in Note 4, the window of opportunity or the subjective 





identical to the equilibrium outcome for institutional changes, since there is a 
probability for the institutional outcome to be different from the elite’s choice when a 
social conflict happens.  
 




The commercial class’s equilibrium choice after observing 𝐤f§ ≥ 𝐤fC  chosen by the 
elite:  





𝟑 < 𝐤f§ < 𝐏
𝟒
𝟑;  




















































Intuitively, the commercial class has no incentive to fight if the institutional 
constraint is high enough (k§̀ > P
(
-), and the commercial class has no ability to fight 
(the class size is very small) if the institutional constraint is very low. This will be 
seen more formally later in solution details. 
The cost-benefit calculations in the political game are based on trade outcomes; I 
therefore use “political trading economy” in the title. The solution details are 
explained next. Readers uninterested in such mathematical details can safely skim 
them, although the solution details make each party’s strategic consideration clearer 
and more formal.  
 
Solution details 
When the commercial class size is smaller than C, the commercial class will not fight 
for a better institution, since the wining probability is then zero. The elite without 























- , there are no institutional changes with the commercial class incapable of 
fighting. This is a straightforward case.  







 , k5=max{k§̀ ,
"
a








k§̀ ≥ kC̀ . I solve the game by backward induction starting from the second stage. 





















-) based on the payoff schedule in the game structure and given the first stage 
choice k§̀ . This is because k§̀  is good enough that the commercial class does not want 
to take risk to fight. Consequently, the commercial class fights when P
(






- . In summary, given k"ªªª ≥ kC̀  chosen by the elite at the first stage, the 





 Fight if k§̀ < P
(
-; Not to fight if k§̀ > P
(
-.  
Now, having been clear about the commercial class’s best response at the second 
stage, we can figure out the ruler’s optimal strategy at the first stage, given the initial 
constraint kC̀  and in anticipation of the commercial class’s response. First, without 
threat the elite’s best strategy is k§̀ = kC̀  when	P
(
- < kC̀ , because the commercial class 
always chooses not to fight with	P
(





 is the maxima of the 
elite’s concave utility under no constraint. 
Second, let us solve the elite’s optimal strategy when	P
(





- . From 
the payoff schedule in the game structure, the elite’s optimization boils down to a 
choice between the maximized payoff when the fight is avoided and the maximized 
payoff when the elite does not avoid conflicts. The former is achieved by choosing 
k§̀ = 	P
(








= 1 − P
(
-, since k§̀  should be at least as large 
as	P
(
- for the elite to avoid conflicts, according to the commercial class’s optimal 









;P1 − kC̀ Q(1 − P). So, the elite’s maximized payoff when the fight 



















;P1 − kC̀ Q(1 − P). 











 (It could be proved that	H < 	P
(
-, though H 
could not be solved analytically—I’ll discuss its existence later). The inequality at the 











, of which the left-
hand side decreases in kC̀ . Then the elite chooses to reform (k§̀ = 	P
(












), and chooses k§̀ = kC̀ toendureconflicts when kC̀ < H. So, 
when	P
(



















- < kC̀ <
𝐻. 
Finally, below is the best strategy of the elite at the first stage in anticipation of 
the commercial class’s response and given kC̀ : 
k§̀ = kC̀ , if P
(
- < kC̀  or kC̀ < 𝐻; k§̀ = 	P
(
- > kC̀ , if P
(
- > kC̀ > 𝐻. 
 
Political equilibrium results 
Based on each party’s equilibrium strategy, three political results follow directly: 
 






- ), there are no institutional changes since the commercial class has no 
capability to fight for a better institution. This threshold positively depends on t5 
and negatively on K55. 
 
Political Result 2: When the initial institutional constraint is high (kC̀ > 	P
(
-), the 
commercial class has no incentive to fight for a better institution and thus there 
are no institutional changes. 
 
Political Result 3: When	P
(
- > kC̀ > H, the commercial class has both ability and 
an incentive to struggle for a better institution if the elite makes no institutional 
changes, and the elite under threat chooses to reform (to improve institutional 
constraint to k§̀ = 	P
(
-) to avoid conflicts. 
 





- < kC̀ < 𝐻, the commercial class has both 
ability and an incentive to struggle for a better institution if the elite makes no 
institutional changes, and the elite chooses to endure the challenge, since loss 






Proof of the Political Results 1-4: These results directly follow the solved 
equilibrium strategies of the commercial class and the extractive elite. 
 
 
Figure 2: The elite’s institutional choice problem 
 
 
Political results for institutional changes have been derived. To understand these 
results more intuitively, I visualize the elite’s optimization problem in Figure 2. What 
follows is how to interpret the figure. 
The upper concave curve is the elite’s utility curve without conflict; the lower 
concave curve is the one when the commercial class initiates a fight. It has been 
proved that the commercial class chooses to fight when the level of institutional 





-  and P
(
-. So, the lower curve is relevant for any 





-  and P
(
-, while the upper one is relevant 








-, k§̀ = kC̀  is best for the elite: this corresponds to Political Results 1 
and 2. The elite chooses Point B (k§̀ = P
(
- ≥ kC̀ ) in the figure if H<kC̀<P
(
-, since the 
elite’s payoff at B (when the upper curve is relevant) is higher than any payoff 
1









The upper concave curve is the 
elite’s utility curve without conflict; 
the lower concave curve is the one 











- (and k§̀ ≥ kC̀ ): this corresponds to Political Result 3. 









Summary of the equilibrium outcomes for institutional changes 
Based on the above political results, Figure 3 summarizes the main insights in this 
work about institutional changes as equilibrium outcomes. 
Institutional changes usually happen when the initial institutional constraint is 
neither very high nor very low, for otherwise the commercial class is either too weak 
or too satisfied to fight for a better institution. Given that the initial institutional 
constraint is interpreted as something developed historically, this is path dependent. 
More interestingly, how high (low) is “very high (low)” depends on transportation 
costs and the economy’s trade partners’ political trade costs (t5 and K55): this is to be 
discussed in next section.  
 
Figure 3: Institutional changes as a function of initial institutional 












Regime 1: no 
institutional changes; the 
commercial class does 
not fight. The upper 
threshold depends on the 
economy’s trade 
partners’ institutional 
quality, as well as its 
own transportation cost. 





Regime 3: peaceful 
reforms; 
institutional quality 
















    Historically, there are both radical and progressive reforms without social conflicts 
(more in Section 4). I model different types of reforms not qualitatively but 
quantitatively. According to the model implications, there is going to be a reform if 
an economy’s initial institutional constraint is within in Regime 3, when the 
commercial class has incentives to fight and the extractive elite finds it best to avoid 
social conflicts by reform. How radical a reform is depends on the distance between 
an economy’s initial institutional constraint and P
(
-, with initial institutional quality 
above which the commercial class no longer has incentives to fight. Different 
countries may have different initial positions or different P
(
-, so we may observe 
radical and progressive reforms in different countries. 








- < 𝐻. (H < P
(
- holds mathematically if H exists.) If part of the assumption 
fails, a regime in Figure 2 might be lost but the rest are interpreted similarly. For 
example, when H doesn’t exist (actually because of a very high P), Regime 2 in 
Figure 2 does not exist and Regime 3 is adjacent to Regime 1: the elite when 
threatened always reforms since P is very high. 
Second, although P is a constant in this setup, the probability for the commercial 
class to win a fight against the elite for a better institution does depend on the class 
size, since the wining probability is zero when the community size is smaller than C 
and the winning probability is P when the community size is larger than C. 
 
 
3. Comparative Statics for institutional changes 
In this section, I discuss comparative statics of the model to understand a mechanism 
behind economic development and institutional changes. I only focus on comparative 










equilibrium, governs movement of an economy from institutional stagnation to 
institutional changes by conflicts or reform. 
 
Comparative Statics with changes in 𝐭𝐢 and 𝐊55 	(t shock and K shock): 





-  as depicted 
in the political equilibrium. 
 
Comparative Statics 1 (t shock): As t5 decreases (e.g., because of a drastic 
improvement in marine technology or geography knowledge), trade expands and per 






-  decreases and thus it is more possible for the economy moves 
from Regime 1 (institutional stagnation) to Regime 2 (conflicts) or 3 (reform), 
according to the political results above. 
 
In particular, as t5 decreases (e.g., due to a drastic improvement in marine 
technology or geography knowledge), trade costs per unit of trade decrease, since the 
per unit trade costs are 1 − K5 with K5 = (1 − t5)k5. This means the people who trade 
consume more traded-in goods for any given amount they pay. Then, more people in 
economy i will switch from self-provision to trade: this is seen from the above 
solution to the decision problem of a typical consumer-producer. With more people to 
trade, gains from specialization increase and consumption per person increases for an 
unchanged amount of labor endowment, seen from above as Economic Result 2 
(welfare increases as t5 decreases). The efficiency is improved because lower trade 
costs induce more specialization. Moreover, the size of commercial community also 
increases according to Economic Result 1, and this connects the economic 
equilibrium to the political one. According the political equilibrium, if the economy’s 
initial institutional quality is high enough, the expanded commercial class constitutes 
a threat to the local extractive elite. Then, through strategic interaction modeled in the 













Comparative Statics 2 (K shock): As K55 increases, trade expands and there is 
economic development (consumption per person increases) in economy i according 





-  decreases and thus it is more 
possible for the economy moves from Regime 1 (institutional stagnation) to Regime 
2 (conflicts) or 3 (reform), according to the political results above. 
 
In particular, with higher K55 and according to Economic Results 1 and 2, 
economy i experiences economic development(consumption per person increases) 
and the commercial class expands, though the degree of changes also depends on 
economy i’s own institution. The intuition is that more people in economy i.will 
demand goods form economy i with increased K55 and consequently profitability of 
trade increases for economy i. If economyi’s initial institutional quality is high 








4. Historical Evidence 
In this section I apply the above economic results and political comparative statics to 
two historical cases that are consistent with the theory. 
 
4.1 The rise of Europe from Atlantic trade 
This part is mainly based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2005b). Below is a t shock story consistent with the above 
comparative statics 1. 
The rise of Europe started from Atlantic trade, i.e., European trade with the New 





t shock story. The crucial factor behind Atlantic trade was gradual marine technology 
improvement that reduced transportation costs for overseas trade. These contributed a 
decrease in physical trade costs such as transportation costs for western European 
countries that participated in Atlantic trade. The location of western European 
countries also rendered them a transportation advantage in Atlantic trade (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005b). Consistent with the above Economic Result 2, there 
was a direct effect of trade on economic development due to decreased transportation 
costs. Trade also had an indirect impact by altering the balance of political power and 
enhancing growth-friendly institutions, especially for trading countries with good 
initial institutions, and this mechanism is consistent with the above political 






-  through development of commercial class, and if economy i 
initially had better institutions, it was more possible for the economy to move from 
Regime 1 to Regime 2 or 3 (i.e., to improve their institutions through either reform by 
the extractive elite or conflicts between merchants and the elite) as depicted in the 
political equilibrium. Finally, the improved institution brought about enhanced 
economic development. These growth outcomes are documented in Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005b) (also see their Figure 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B). 
As emphasized in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2005b), the development of the commercial class is the pivot. Consistent 
with the Economic Result 1 and the political equilibrium, the commercial class 
(mainly including overseas merchants) expansion induced by Atlantic trade was both 
a driving force behind and manifestation of economic development for countries 
participating in Atlantic trade; for countries participating in Atlantic trade with 
relatively better initial institutions, their commercial classes were more likely to fight 
for better institutions (low expropriation). This explains the difference in 
development and institutional improvement between a few western European 
countries.  
The history is also consistent with the Political Results that formalize the 





Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and France all have access to Atlantic trade and enjoyed 
trade induced economic development. However, Great Britain and the Netherlands 
have merchant groups being active not only in economic activities, but also in 
political arenas in struggling for and maintaining better institutions, because they are 
relatively better initial institutions (less royal control on merchants). In Great Britain 
during the (English) Civil War (1462-1649) and the Glorious Revolution (1688-
1689), Atlantic merchants using their profits and through Parliamentarian forces 
successfully constrained royal power and strengthened merchant rights. In the 
Netherlands, commercial interests mainly that were involved in Atlantic trade won 
independence from the Habsburg monarchy and thus established a more secure 
commercial environment that lead to the Netherlands’ economic prosperity in the 
early modern era. The cases of Great Britain and the Netherlands echo Political 
Result 3. In contrast, Spanish, Portuguese and French merchants each were subject to 
much more royal influence, or, to put it in another way, merchants who traded in 
these countries had to pay a lot to the local extractive elite (higher trade costs); with 
worse initial institutions, the commercial classes in these countries were not 
developed enough to drastically influence institutional changes (Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2005b). The cases of Spain, Portugal and French echo Political Result 
1. 
In sum, the economic development directly induced by Atlantic trade in early 
modern Europe is consistent with the Economic results. The political equilibrium 
results also replicate the institutional changes in countries with better initial 
institutions and the role played by the commercial class in institutional changes. 
  
4.2 19th century Germany under French rule 
This part is mainly based on Keller and Shiue (2016) and Acemoglu, Cantoni, 
Johnson and Robinson (2011), and is a K shock story consistent with the above 
comparative statics 2. 
The French Revolution was exported mainly by French armies in late 18th 
century to many European countries. The export was in form of radical, “designed” 





show that such export had positive economic impacts for economic units affected, 
specifically for German cities with institutional reforms imposed by French rule 
around 1800. Keller and Shiue (2016) empirically test a mechanism behind such 
positive impacts. They use an instrumental-variable approach and conclude that most 
impact of institutional improvement on city development is through market 
integration that I interpret as expanded trade. This echoes the model here.  
The institutional improvements induced by French rule were mainly imposition 
of the civil legal code, the abolition of guilds and the remnants of feudalism, 
according to Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2011). These improvements 
relate to changes in k in the model here, and according to the above Economic Result 
2, improvement in k (thus increase in K) contributes to economic development 
through expanded trade for both economic units with k improvement and economic 
units trading with the unit whose k is improved. This model implication or 
mechanism is empirically supported by Keller and Shiue (2016). 
In particular, Keller and Shiue (2016) use (1) the abolition of guilds, (2) the 
possibility of redeeming feudal lands, and (3) a guarantee of equality before the law 
to measure institutional improvement. These measures relate to changes in k in my 
model: (1) and (3) directly reduced trade costs and made it easy for a wide range of 
people to operate their business; (2) reduced expropriation risk. The econometric 
analysis of Keller and Shiue (2016) shows not only these institutional improvements 
expanded trade and consequently stimulated economic development, but also trade 
was the major channel through which institutional improvements stimulated 
economic development. This is consistent with my model. More interesting and 
specific, they also show both a city’s and its trade partner’s institutional 
improvements had a significantly positive impact on the city’s economic development 
through trade expansion, which support this work further. This is especially 
consistent with Economic Result 2, per which the development of an economic unit 
depends on both its own trade costs and those of its trade partner’s. 
Finally, Keller and Shiue (2016) also show market integration (expanded trade) 
did not significantly affect institutional changes in their historical context. This does 





Institutional changes in their historical context were externally driven by outside 
forces as French rule, which is different from the political game in this work that 
emphasizes endogenous forces driving institutional changes.  
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In the previous 4 sections, I have introduced model intuitions, formalized the 
mechanism, discussed model comparative statics, and provided historical evidence. In 
this last section, I’ll provide a few discussions related to this work, with the hope that 
they may stimulate further thinking or at least be interesting. 
Although more empirical evidence is needed, I have used historical evidence to 
support my model, but I think this model also sheds insightful light on understanding 
current affairs. Currently, we see a lot of trade protections especially from developing 
countries (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2009). The presence and degree of such 
protections determine trade costs and can only be well understood from a political 
economy perspective. Here, by a political economy perspective, I mean political 
groups interact with each other under economic benefit-cost calculations. The model 
in this work contributes to our understanding of these issues by a micro-foundation 
emphasizing people’s tradeoff between trade costs and specialization gains, as well as 
how economic potentials can feed political interactions that lead to further economic 
implications. The model emphasizes a possible mechanism that may be applicable to 
issues involving trade costs, specialization, institutions, political interactions, and 
economic development. 
This model begins from the decision problem of a typical consumer-producer 
who produces, consumes, and decides whether to trade with her production. This is 
different from the commonly used neoclassical consumer-producer dichotomy. There 
is no best choice since purposes define methods. The advantages of starting from a 
consumer-producer rest at its convenience and insightfulness in modeling endogenous 
labor division. Such an approach puts trade costs directly against gains from 
specialization, as shown by this work and Yang (2003). This is a central theme of 





sometimes less feasible to widely inject financial resources or high-quality human 
capitals, nor is the technology frontier always relevant. However, reducing trade costs 
by social or economic reorganization and letting specialization to boostrap 
development from given resources may be a more economical and effective choice in 
most cases. Thus, I think modeling beginning with a typical consumer-producer 
should and will provide more useful insights in development problems. 
This work is about mechanism. Many works (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005a; North, 1990) show the 
importance of good institutions for economic development. But, the mechanism 
problem, i.e., channels through which institutions matter and how institutions change, 
is relatively not well cooked. As James Robinson said, “possibly the biggest thing we 
don't understand in social science is how and why a society moves from one 
institutional equilibrium to another.” This work approaches the mechanism problem 
by formalizing the mutual promotion between institutional improvement and trade 
expansion, as well as how such mutuality stimulates economic development. It 
emphasizes two methodological aspects: first, an integration of economic and 
political equilibria is usually necessary to understand institutional changes (North, 
1981); second, echoing to Greif (2006), we sometimes need an equilibrium structure 
that comprises two layers. The parameters controlling the upper layer is usually an 
equilibrium outcome of the lower layer governed by another set of parameters or their 
ranges. 
Finally, this work as mainly a theoretical work needs to be confronted with more 
supporting or denying evidence as well as data analysis testing mechanisms. 
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